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ORGANIZATION OF SELF-EMPLOYERS
BY UNIONS
Fred Herzog*

T

HE ORGANIZATION of self-employers by unions presents a vexing
problem.' Ostensibly and obviously, both groups are aligned
against each other, each group attempting to obtain for itself
the greatest amount of economic advantage. While a number of
factors contribute to the intensity of the struggle between them,
the decisive and determinative issue, at least as far as the legal
evaluation of the problem is concerned, is the economic one. Both
groups compete actively with each other, because both desire to
receive the maximum amount of work in the field of their trade
in the community in which they operate. No great amount of
imagination is required to see that these competitive interests
will be apt to clash and thereby often engender an aftermath in
court.
The importance of the problem is enhanced by the fact that
the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, commonly known as
* D.u.j., J.D. Member, Iowa and Illinois bars. Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent
College of Law.
1 This article treats only with attempts by labor unions to get the self-employed
person to join the union, thereby compelling him to comply with union standards.
No attempt is made to discuss the somewhat related subject matter of efforts by
unions to compel self-employers to cease doing work, without accepting, or offering
to accept, them into membership of the union, as a means to compel the employment
of union labor. For a typical case of the latter kind, see Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal.
(2d) 746, 155 P. (2d) 343 (1944), upholding an injunction against a milk wagon
drivers' union which was attempting to coerce dairies from supplying the plaintiffs
with milk products. Plaintiffs therein were independent peddlers of milk working
without the help of any employees and, upon application, had been refused membership in the defendant union.

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

the Taft-Hartley Act,2 declares the attempted organization of any
"self-employed person" to be an unlawful labor objective 3 As
that statute does not define the term "self-employed person,"
difficult questions of statutory interpretation may well arise for
the term is not so definite or free from doubt as might appear at
first glance.
In most instances, when courts were called upon to function
as arbiters between these conflicting economic groups, they dealt
with and decided the issues in accordance with their own economic
philosophies rather than on the basis of any well-formulated
principle founded upon sound reasoning. It is true that some
courts, the United States Supreme Court being notable among
them, have attempted to put their thoughts with respect to the
problem into definite policies, but it seems that these policies are
often times acted on "rather as inarticulate instincts than as
This
definite ideas, for which a rational defense is ready. "4
article, therefore, will attempt to establish the basis for a policy
which, the writer believes, might be utilized to deal justly and
effectively with the problem in question. In doing so, the subject
matter will be treated only from the point of view of the legality
of the objective and no attempt will be made to discuss the
legality of the means employed to reach that objective.
It would serve no useful purpose, in the following synopsis
of court decisions, to provide a complete enumeration and analysis
of all cases on the subject. The cases analyzed and referred to,
however, may be used to demonstrate the way in which courts
have approached the issue and determined it. Any discussion
thereof necessitates a rather detailed statement of the factual
situations therein involved.
2 61 Stat. 136; 29 U. S. C. A. § 141 et seq.
3 Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U. S. C. A. § 158),
as amended, states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents . . . to engage in,or to induce or encourage the employees of any
employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal . . . where an object thereof
is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor
or employer organization." Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947, 29 U. S. C. A. § 187, permits recovery of damages by any person injured in his
business by boycotts and strikes designed to accomplish that purpose, provided the
same arise in "an industry or activity affecting commerce."
4 Holmes, J., in his dissent to Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92 at 106, 44 N. E.
1077 at 1080, 35 L. R. A. 722 at 726, 57 Am. St. Rep. 443 (1896).
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I.

PRIOR JUDICIAL TRzATMENT

Perhaps the most outstanding case in the field is that of
Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union,5 although it was not primarily concerned with the efforts of a union to induce a selfemployer to become a union member. The facts therein disclose
that Senn was engaged in the tile-contracting business. His business was a small one, conducted, in the main, from his residence,
with a showroom elsewhere. He employed, at times, one or two
journeymen tile layers and one or two helpers, depending upon
the amount of work he had contracted to do. Much of the work,
of a character commonly done by a tile layer or helper, was personally performed by him on various jobs. The journeymen tile
layers in the community were, to a large extent, members of a tile
layers protective union, while the helpers belonged to a separate
organization. Neither Senn, nor any of his employees was a union
member. Indeed, Senn could not become a member of the former
union for its rules required, among other things, that a journeyman tile layer should have acquired his practical experience by
means of an apprenticeship having a duration of not less than
three years. Senn had not served such an apprenticeship.
The defendant unions had attempted to induce as many employers in the area as was possible to assent to the conduct of
their businesses as union shops. All contracts made between the
defendant unions and union employers contained the following
provision:
Article III. It is definitely understood that no individual,
member of a partnership or corporation engaged in the Tile
Contracting Business shall work with the tools or act as
Helper but that the installation of all materials claimed by
the party of the second part as listed under the caption
"Classification of Work" in the agreement, shall be done by
journeymen members of Tile Layers Protective Union, Local
No. 5.6
5 301 U. S. 468, 57 S. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229 (1937).
6 301 U. S. 468 at 474, 57 S. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229 at 1234.
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Such a contract was presented to Senn, who evidenced a willingness to execute it provided Article III was eliminated, for the
inclusion thereof would clearly prevent him from working personally on the job. When the unions declared that this was impossible, the inclusion being deemed essential to the unions' interests in the maintenance of wage standards and the spreading of
work among their members, while the elimination of the article
would result in a discrimination against existing union contractors, Senn refused to sign. The unions thereupon peacefully
picketed his place of business, causing Senn to seek an injunction
on the ground that no labor dispute was involved and the picketing
amounted to an interference with his property rights as protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Wisconsin courts refused to
grant Senn the relief sought and the United States Supreme Court
affirmed that action.
The majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice Brandeis,
pointed to the deplorable state in which the tile laying industry
had found itself because of the lack of building operations with
the resultant competition which existed between members of the
union on the one hand and non-union tile layers on the other in
their efforts to secure work. The end sought by the union was
declared not to be unconstitutional and the contract provision
which Senn had been asked to accept was found not to be arbitrary or capricious, but a reasonable rule "adopted by the
defendants out of the necessities of employment within the industry and for the protection of themselves as workers and craftsmen
in the industry."' 7 There was no basis for any suggestion that
the unions' request that Senn should refrain from working with
his own hands, or their employment of picketing and publicity,
was malicious in any sense, done simply from a desire to injure
Senn. Each of the contestants was interested in the advantage
to be gained from doing the business of the community, but the
unions had acted, and had the right to act, as they did to protect
the interests of their members against the harmful effects upon
them of Senn's action.
7 301 U. S. 468 at 480, 57 S. Ct. 857, 51 L. Ed. 1229 at 1237.

ORGANIZATION OF SELF-EMPLOYERS

The most cursory glance at the opinion will reveal the idea
expressed by the majority to the effect that union workers and
self-employers, when engaged in the same type of work, areviewed economically-nothing else than competitors and that both
have the right to attempt, by all lawful means, to secure work. In
that regard, the court noted that each
member of the unions, as well as Senn, has the right to strive
to earn his living. Senn seeks to do so through exercise of
his individual skill and planning. The union members seek
to do so through combination. Earning a living is dependent
upon securing work; and securing work is dependent upon
public favor. To win the patronage of the public, each may
strive by legal means. 8
The idea that employers and employees are engaged in competition with each other cannot be said to be a new one. Chief
Justice Taft had recognized it long before the decision in the Senn
case when, in the case of American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City
Central Trades Council,9 he spoke of the "lawful economic
struggle or competition between employer and employees as to
the share or division between them of the joint product of labor
and capital." 10 Even earlier than that, Justice Holmes, while
serving on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, had, in
his dissenting opinion in the case of Vegelalm v. Guntner,1 spoken
of the policy of free competition which "applies to all conflicts
of temporal interests" and is "not limited to struggles between
persons of the same class" but justifies "the intentional inflicting
of temporal damage, including the damage of interference with a
man's business by some means when the damage is done, not for
its own sake, but as an instrumentality in reaching the end of
victory in the battle of trade. 12 Yet, it was in the Senn case, for
the first time, that the highest court of the land recognized such
8 301 U. S. 468 at 482, 57 S. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229 at 1238.
9 257 U. S. 184, 42
10 257 U. S. 184 at
11167 Mass. 92, 44
12 167 Mass. 92 at

S. Ct. 72, 66 L. Ed. 189, 27 A. L. R. 360 (1921).
209, 42 S. Ct. 72, 66 L. Ed. 189 at 199-200.
N. E. 1077, 35 L. R. A. 722, 57 Am. St. Rep. 443 (1896).
106, 44 N. E. 1077 at 1081.
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far-reaching economic pressure as lawful when exercised by a
union against a self-employer.
The United States Supreme Court followed its line of thinking, expressed in the Senn case, five years later in the case of
Bakery & Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local 802 of I. B. T. v.
Wohl. 1 3 The union there involved consisted of truck drivers who
were occupied in the distribution of baked goods. Wohl and
Platzman, the plaintiffs, were peddlers of baked goods who bought
from commercial bakeries and sold and delivered to small retailers,
their profit being the difference between cost and selling price
which, in the case of Wohl, was approximately thirty-two dollars
a week and, in the case of Platzman, slightly more. Out of that
amount, each had to absorb any credit losses and also maintain
the delivery truck which he owned. Both worked seven days a
week. Neither of them had a contract with the bakeries from
which he bought, or any contract with the customer.
The conflict grew out of certain significant back-ground facts.
It appeared that the union had, for several years, been engaged
in obtaining collective bargaining agreements, prescribing the
wages, hours, and working conditions of the bakery drivers. Five
years or so prior to the trial, there had been comparatively few
peddlers or so-called independent jobbers in the field but, with
the advent of social security and unemployment compensation
laws and their attendant taxes on payrolls, the number of peddlers
increased by leaps and bounds. Some eighteen months before the
trial, the baking companies, operating through employee-drivers,
had notified the union that, at the expiration of existing contracts,
they would no longer employ such men although they would
permit the drivers to purchase the trucks for nominal amounts,
in some instances as little as fifty dollars, after which the workers
might continue to distribute the baked goods as peddlers.' 4 Ap13 315 U. S. 769, 62 S. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed. 1178 (1942).
14 Serious disadvantages to the peddler existed under this arrangement in that
he was not covered by workmen's compensation insurance, by unemployment compensation insurance, or by state or federal social security plans. If injured while
working, he and his family would be apt to become public charges. For that matter,
the truck was usually not insured against public liability or property damage, being
commonly carried in the name of the peddler's wife or other nominee.
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proximately one hundred and fifty union drivers who had previously worked under the union contracts were so discharged.
The union, being alarmed at the aggressive inroads made by
this kind of competition and fearing the loss of all that had been
gained by long years of struggle, attempted to persuade the
peddlers to become union members. Those who so wished were
admitted to membership on the understanding that they would
abide by the same union rules and regulations as applied to other
members, including the requirement that no union member should
work more than six days per week. Wohl and Platzman were
solicited and each did sign an application, but neither joined.
Efforts were then made to persuade them to work only six days a
week, hiring an unemployed union member for the other day.
Wohl did do so for a time, but eventually both he and Platzman
refused either to join the union or to comply and continued to
work the full seven days. The union thereupon began to picket
the bakeries which sold to them as well as the retailers who bought
from them. An injunction granted by a New York state court,
which enjoined the union's conduct, was deemed, by the United
States Supreme Court, to violate the right of free speech guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
It may be said that the high court thereby recognized the
lawfulness of the union's objective, one which, at least in part,
sought the unionization of self-employers in a situation where
the working conditions under which such self-employers operated
vitally affected the employment conditions of the union members.
The introduction of the peddler system, attempted by employers
in an effort to lower the union's conditions of work, led to competition on unequal terms, competition which deprived many union
men of their means of livelihood or threatened their wage and
living standards. An equalization of the terms of competition by
peaceful picketing was, therefore, considered lawful.
It cannot be said, however, that the state courts have always
shared this view regarding the problem of unionization of selfemployers. Some have treated union conduct designed to achieve
that aim as an unlawful labor objective while the difference in
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opinion has gone so far that courts, even in the same jurisdiction,
have reached conflicting results. Typical of that divergence of
opinion is the example afforded by two decisions pronounced by
the Illinois Appellate Court. In the first case, that of Naprawa
v. Chicago Flat Janitors' Union,15 the plaintiffs, who were husband and wife, had purchased an apartment building. The janitor
work around the premises was done solely by the husband. When
the business agent of the union told the husband that he had to
join the union, he at first agreed but then refused to complete
payment of the membership fee, asserting his right to perform
the janitor work without joining. Thereafter, the union placed a
picket line around the apartment building, preventing delivery of
goods to the premises as well as the performance of work thereon
by painters, decorators and other workmen. An injunction restraining the union from such conduct, and forbidding the union
from interfering with the husband's right to act as janitor of the
premises, was reversed by the Appellate Court.
It quoted with approval from the Washington case of O'Neil
v. Building Service Employees InternationalUnion, No. 6,10 dealing with a similar factual situation, wherein the court, relying on
the holding in American Federationof Labor v. Swing,' 7 had said:
If a labor union has the legal right to picket, as unfair to
organized labor, the place of business of an employer who
refuses to compel his employees to join such union or to discharge them for refusal to become members of the picketing
union, it logically follows that a labor union has the legal
right to go a step farther and peacefully picket the place of
business of a person who has no employees, one doing business
as an individual proprietor, to compel, against his will, such
15 315 Il1. App. 328, 43 N. E. (2d) 198 (1942). Leave to appeal denied: 382 I1.
124, 46 N. E. (2d) 27 (1943).
169 Wash. (2d) 507, 115 P. (2d) 662, 137 A. L. R. 1102 (1941). That case was
expressly overruled in the later case of Gazzam v. Building Service Employee's
Int. Union, 29 Wash. (2d) 488, 188 P. (2d) 97 (1947), which reversed a trial court
judgment and remanded the case for purpose of assessing damages. It is understood that, after judgment awarding damages, the Washington Supreme Court
affirmed by reason of a division of the court, A petition for certiorari in the last
mentioned case is now pending before the United States Supreme Court.
17 312 U. S. 321, 61 S. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 855 (1941).

ORGANIZATION

OF SELF-EMPLOYERS

lone person or individual proprietor to join the picketing
union."'
Direct contrast thereto is provided by the decision in Dinoffria
v. Teamsters' Union, Local No. 179,19 wherein the plaintiffs, again
husband and wife, were operators of a gasoline filling station.
They conducted the business without the aid of employees, on
premises and with equipment leased to them' by a large gasoline
supplying company from which they also purchased all gasoline
and petroleum products sold at the station. The gasoline supplies
were delivered in tank trucks driven by company employees who
were members of the defendant union. Dinoffria was approached
by an agent of the union, which represented, among other groups,
the filling station employees, and was asked to join. As joining
would have required compliance with certain working conditions
prevailing in unionized filling stations, Dinoffria refused to apply
for membership. The union drivers of the gasoline supplying
company, on instructions given by the union, refused to make
further deliveries and suit followed. The trial court denied plaintiff's claim for an injunction and damages, but the Illinois Appellate Court reversed the judgment, making the following characteristic, although totally incorrect, statement:
In no case, however, has the Court sanctioned, or been called
upon to approve peaceful picketing or boycotting or other
conduct of a labor union where it has been directed against
a self-employer who has no employees, as in the instant
20
case.
The court indicated that the sole dispute touched on Dinoffria's refusal to join the union and, as a concomitant part thereof,
to sign a contract regulating the hours of work and the manner in
18 9 Wash. (2d) 507 at 513, 115 P. (2d) 662 at 664.
19331 Ill. App. 129, 72 N. E. (2d) 635 (1947), noted in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REviEw 343-8. Writ of error was dismissed in 399 Ill. 304, 77 N. E. (2d) 661 (1948).
20 331 Ill. App. 129 at 135, 72 N. E. (2d) 635 at 638.

Such categorical pronounce-

ments admitting of no exceptions, whether made by a court or an attorney, are
dangerous and should be avoided, especially if not based upon thorough research.
Investigation would have revealed a number of cases, in Illinois and in other
jurisdictions, deeming the unionization of self-employers to be a lawful labor
objective.
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which he was to conduct his business. It was difficult to perceive,
the court declared, how union men could improve their working
conditions by compelling one who was self-employed, with no
employees, to become a member of their union. There could be
no contention advanced that Dinoffria was failing to meet the
standards of wages and employment fixed by the union, thereby
jeopardizing the rights of workingmen in the same industry, for
he had no employees to whom he could pay wages. It was
impossible to perceive how the union was being harmed, so the
only conceivable effect of membership in the union would be to
put the union in a position where it could regulate the hours
during which the station was kept open and to prohibit the use
of premiums to stimulate sales. The primary purpose, then, of
the union, in attempting to gain Dinoffria as a member, was not
to obtain benefits for the existing membership but to inflict injury
on Dinoffria. That, of course, was regarded as an unlawful union
objective.
Is there not some contradiction in these conclusions? The
union, very obviously, was -attempting through unionization to
introduce uniform working hours in the industry as well as to
abolish the practice of furnishing sales premiums to customers.
If non-union stations could keep open at all hours and offer
premiums, it would mean that more and more customers would
frequent them, leading to a loss of business for the unionized
stations. The eventual effect that loss of business would have
on the wage and living standards of union members requires no
further demonstration.
II.

LAWFULNESS OF UNION OBJECTIVE

The first emotional reaction to a question asking whether
there is any justification for unions to organize self-employers
may be best expressed in the form of still another question, i.e.
what business has a union even attempting to organize men who
are not employees? Is it not the function of a union, as well as
the justification for the concerted activities of its members, to
organize employees? If so, then the attempt to organize inde-
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pendent businessmen, even if they be small entrepreneurs who
risk only a few dollars through business initiative while earning
a living in much the same manner as would employees, is properly
beyond the legitimate scope of union endeavor.2 1
In general, it must be said that unions have no business
attempting to organize the self-employers and should confine their
efforts to promoting the interests of the employee class. Such
was the primary incentive for the creation of unions and has traditionally served to mark the domain in which unions operate.
Justification for a rule which would generally forbid interference
by unions with the employer class lies in the fact that the small
22
self-employer, or "businessman-worker" as he has been called,
the one who is the most frequent target of unionization efforts,
performs an important economic function in modern life. In his
capacity as serviceman or repairman, he often benefits the low
income groups of the population, the ones most likely to call for
his services. Moreover, in a growing era of monopoly and collectivism, he is one of the last and staunchest bulwarks of the free
enterprise system. Unionization might undermine his position
23
and eventually lead to his extinction.
21 To this effect, see the opinion of Judge Cotillo in Stalban v. Friedman, 171
Misc. 106, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 343 (1939).
22 For usage of this term, see Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal. (2d) 746, 155 P. (2d)
343 (1944), and Charles 0. Gregory-Harold A. Katz, Labor Law: Cases, Materials
and Comments (Michie Casebook Corporation, Charlottesville, Va., 1948), p. 343
et seq.
23 One view of the economic status of the small self-employer is given in Stalban
v. Friedman, 171 Misc. 106 at 119-20, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 343 at 355-6 (1939), where
the court noted that "the plaintiff is a small restaurant owner. She is by such
token called an entrepreneur. She falls within a group which in number, throughout industry, runs into many hundreds of thousands. The slim economic margin
between success or failure in these myriad thousands of small retail businesses or
establishments is quickly consumed. Too great a measure of the 'incidental injury'
referred to must represent serious damage, not merely incidental damage to all
In the instant case, to speak of picketing being permitted
such small business ....
because economic issues are solely involved, would drive the plaintiff's business to
the wall. Bankruptcies must obviously increase under such circumstances and
scores of small enterprises be forced to give up . . . Can unions be trusted with
such power? Should unions be trusted with such power? Were unions intended to
be trusted with such power? . . . We are concerned with the disappearance of a
numerous small entrepreneur class risking its few dollars through business initiative and seeking to earn a living in much the same manner as the . . . proletariat
does. Against his extinction . . . equity may not support a doctrine hostile to all
equity law. For equity to be silent here is to acquiesce in the arraignment of one
class against another, and passively watch the extinction of the one by the other
in openly declared impotence . . . It is the expropriation of an entire class from
our social order."
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III. EXCEPTIONS TO GENERAL RULE
Any general rule, such as the one just announced, has, or
rather should have, its exceptions else it becomes dogmatic in its
applications. The exceptions expostulated below in this article
are perceived out of economic necessity. They have not been
invented or created merely from a desire to produce conformity
to the time-honored legal maxim that every rule has its exceptions.
A.

THREAT FROM PRESENT COMPETITION

There are and should be important exceptions to the general
rule which declares the unionization of self-employers to be an
unlawful labor objective. First, consider the situation of the
self-employer who is engaged in the same type of work and
performs, with the skill of his hands, the same sort of labor as
the organized employee. If he competes effectively with organized
workmen, being in a position to charge a lower price for his work
than others because not burdened by the same charges as fall on
them such as social security taxes, should not the union be allowed
to subject him to the same means of persuasion as would apply
to other workmen in the effort to compel him to join the union and
conform to the conditions which regulate union labor? Is it not
the very purpose and function of the union to protect membership,
and thereby unionized business, from the "undercutting influences '24 which force lower working conditions for persons engaged in the same trade? The answer to these questions must
obviously and clearly be in the affirmative.
It was recognized, at a comparatively early stage, that workmen have the right to attempt to enlarge the membership of their
union by seeking to bring all those within the fold of their
organization who are engaged in the same type of work in the
community. Recognition thereof was based not only upon the
economic principle that workmen and employers, engaged in the
same industry, do compete with each other over the share and
24

Gregory-Katz, op. cit., p. 941.
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division between them of the joint product of capital and labor
but also upon the established fact that the working conditions of
all persons engaged in a given trade vitally affect the wage and
living standards of union members performing the same type of
work in the locality. The best legal formulation of that concept
is to be found in the words of Chief Justice Taft. He wrote, in
American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council,25
that a
single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer.
He was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family. If the employer refused to
pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless
unable to leave the employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair
treatment. Union was essential to give laborers opportunity
to deal on equality with their employer. They united to exert
influence upon him and to leave him in a body in order by
this inconvenience to induce him to make better terms with
them .... The strike became a lawful instrument in a lawful
economic struggle or competition between employer and employees as to the share or division between them of the joint
product of labor and capital. To render this combination
at all effective, employees must make their combination extend
beyond one shop. It is helpful to have as many as may be in
the same trade in the same community united, because in the
competition between employers they are bound to be affected
by the standard of wages of their trade in the neighborhood.
Therefore, they may use all lawful propaganda to enlarge
their membership and especially among those whose labor at
lower wages will injure their whole guild. It is impossible to
hold such persuasion and propaganda, without more, to be
without excuse and malicious. 26
Twenty years later, Justice Frankfurter more tersely restated the
idea when he came to note that the "interdependence of economic
25 257 U. S. 184, 42 S. Ct. 72, 66 L. Ed. 189, 27 A. L. R. 360 (1921).
26 257 U. S. 184 at 209, 42 S. Ct. 72, 66 L. Ed. 189 at 199-200. Italics added.
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interest of all engaged in the same industry has become a commonplace. 1127
Judge Andrews, writing the opinion in Exchange Bakery and
Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin,2 8 expressed much the same thought
when he stated that the
purpose of a labor union to improve the conditions under
which its members do their work; to increase their wages;
to assist them in other ways may justify what would otherwise be a wrong. So would an effort to increase its members
and to unionize an entire trade or business. It may be as
interested in the wages of those not members, or in the conditions under which they work, as in its own members because
of the influence of one upon the other. All engaged in a trade
are affected by the prevailing rate of wages. All, by the
principle of collective bargaining. Economic organization
today is not based on a single shop. Unions believe that
wages may be increased, collective bargaining maintained
only if union conditions prevail, not in some single factory
but generally. That they may prevail it may call a strike and
picket the premises of an employer with the intent of inducing
him to employ only union labor. And it may adopt either
method separately . . . Both are based upon a lawful pur29
pose.
The subject should not be left without noting that Chief Judge
Cardozo, in Nann v. Raimist,3° also indicated that if a union
believes in good faith that a policy pursued by an employer and
by the shops united with him is hostile to the interests of organized labor, and is likely, if not suppressed, to lower the standard
of living for workers in the trade, "it has the privilege by the
pressure of notoriety and persuasion to bring its own policy to
triumph. '31
27 American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 at 326, 61 S. Ct. 568,
85 L. Ed. 855 at 857 (1941).
28 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927).
29245 N. Y. 260 at 263, 157 N. E. 130 at 132-3.
30 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690, 73 A. L. R. 669 (1931).
31255 N. Y. 307 at 314, 174 N. E. 690 at 693.
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These and other decisions have recognized that industries
and trades operating in certain geographical areas must be considered as economic entities wherein the working conditions which
prevail in one are so interrelated to the others that the working
conditions which prevail in one plant belonging to the entity are
so interrelated to those existing in another plant of the same
entity that lower working standards have a definite adverse effect
upon higher wage and living standards. Decisions of this character recognize that such interrelation between working conditions
and wage and living standards is based upon the principle of free
competition, but also understand that such competition is not confined solely to members of the same group, extending as it does
to members of various groups in society, both employers and
employes. 32 The existence of such an economic conflict, then, has
been said to justify "the intentional inflicting of temporal damage,
including the damage of interference with a man's business by
some means, when the damage is done, not for its own sake, but
as an instrumentality in reaching the end of victory in the battle
of trade.' '3
If the accepted doctrine be that union members, in the furtherance of their self-interest, whether to improve or to avert threats
to their living standards, may engage in concerted activities, then
it must be recognized that they may engage in such activities
regardless of whether these activities be directed against the
inferior working conditions of employees laboring in a large
plant or against the substandard working conditions of the selfemployer. The determinative factor for the lawfulness of the
union's conduct is, then, the interest of the union in achieving a
better living standard for its members as well as the protection
of that standard from all corroding influences. The lawfulness
32 Justice Holmes, in his dissenting opinion in Vegelahn v. Gunther, 167 Mass.
92 at 107, 44 N. E. 1077 at 1081, 35 L. R. A. 722, 57 Am. St. Rep. 443 (1896), once
noted that he had seen the suggestion made "that the conflict between employers
and employed was not competition. But I venture to assume that none of my
brethren would rely on that suggestion. If the policy on which our law is founded
is too narrowly expressed in the term 'free competition,' we may substitute 'free
struggle for life.' Certainly, the policy is not limited to struggles between persons
of the same class, competing for the same end. It applies to all conflicts of temporal
interests."
33 167 Mass. 92 at 106, 44 N. E. 1077 at 1081.
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of the union's objective, when attempting to prevent grave inroads
upon those standards, ought not be made to depend upon the
source from which the danger emanates, whether that source be
a single self-employer or a corporation employing thousands of
non-union workers. Instead, the legality of the union's conduct
should depend upon whether or not the operations which it attacks
are harmful to the interests of its members and do endanger and
threaten their working and living conditions. In the face of a
present danger, the union should have the right to pursue all
peaceful means, including picketing, to attempt to eliminate that
4
dangerA
The first exception to the general rule, that concerted activities of unions are unlawful if they have as their purpose the
organization of self-employers, may then be formulated to be as
follows: A union may, by peaceful conduct, attempt the organization of a self-employer if (1) such self-employer is engaged in the
same general field of trade or industry in which all or some
members of the organizing union are engaged, and if (2) the
self-employer, by virtue of the lower working conditions under
which he performs his work, either alone or with the aid of a few
helpers, effectively competes with the union men and unionized
businesses so as to undermine or threaten to influence disadvantageously the working conditions or the wage and living standards
of the union men.
Recognition has been accorded to that exception in both the
Senn 3' and the Woh 36 cases referred to above. In the first of
these cases, the court, evaluating the unionization efforts, stated
that the union "acted, and bad the right to act as they did, to
protect the interests of their members against the harmful effect
upon them of Senn's action."' 3 7 In the other, the high court
adopted the trial court's findings to the effect that, if employers
34 The danger should, of course, be an existing and an effective one, not one
merely pretended in order to give union members an excuse for destroying the
business of a person against whom they happen to harbor some personal dislike.
35 301 U. S. 468, 57 S. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229 (1937).
36 315 U. S. 769, 62 S. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed. 1178 (1942).
37 301 U. S. 468 at 481, 57 S. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229 at 1237. Italics added.
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with union contracts were forced to accept the peddler system
attacked therein, the wages, hours, working conditions, and benefits "attained by the union after long years of struggle [would]
be destroyed and lost. " 3s Sanction for the concerted union activities there involved rested upon the well-understood fact that a
continuation of the methods adopted by the self-employer would
ultimately destroy the union man's basis for earning a living in
his chosen occupation.
No mention has been made, in dealing with the exception
under discussion, of the fact that the Taft-Hartley Act purports
to prohibit the use of strikes and boycotts for the purpose of
unionizing self-employers. So far as the federal jurisdictional
orbit is concerned, of course, no unionization of self-employers is
practically permissible so long as that statute stands, regardless of
whether such self-employers effectively compete with union members or not. Apart from a discussion of this problem to be found
farther on, it might be sufficient to emphasize here, as was done
by an expert in this field, 39 that the prohibition of the Taft-Hartley
Act can hardly have any practical effect, for, in general, the
organizational efforts of unions heretofore directed against selfemployers have been limited to industries in which the effect upon
commerce comes under the de minimis doctrine expressed in
National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt,40 that is in trades
such as those followed by barbers, painters, retail dealers, and
41
other small entrepreneurs.
When it is remembered that jurisdiction over a union, for
engaging in unfair labor practices under Section 8(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley
38 315 U. S. 769 at 771, 62 S. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed. 117a at 1182.
39 Van Arkel, An Analysis of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Prac-

tising Law Institute, New York, 1947), particularly p. 50.
40306 U. S. 601, 59 S. Ct. 668, 83 L. Ed. 1014 (1939).
41 It would seem, according to Gregory-Katz, op. cit., p. 941, that Senator Murray
did not share Van Arkel's opinion. He is said to have declared that the provision
in the Taft-Hartley Act with respect to self-employed persons may give "rise to the
use by employers of so-called self-employed persons to undermine the wage and
hours standards of employees" since it "would prevent the regular employees from
taking effective action in such situations even though their wage and hour standards
were directly and intimately involved."
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Act, is dependent on whether the particular employer and not the
union involved is "engaged in operations affecting commerce,"
it can be assumed that not many cases in this field will reach the
National Labor Relations Board. The same prediction might also
be ventured with respect to the possibility of there being cases
which could be brought before appropriate federal courts under
Section 303 of the Taft-Hartley Act, which purports to entitle
any person, injured in his business by boycotts or strikes caused
by a union in order to achieve the organization of the self-employer, to recover his damages. It is not anticipated, then, that
the problem of the unionization of self-employers will be solved
by legislative fiat, not even in those states which have enacted, or
may enact, statutes outlawing the unionization of self-employers.
The term "self-employer," apt to be found therein, is ambiguous
and cannot be easily defined if the present-day realities of economic dependence are taken into consideration. Construction of
that term, or similar ones, will become necessary, so the problem
must come before the courts to determine the issue.
B.

THREAT FROM

N'OMINAL SELF-EMPLOYERS

The second exception to the general rule actually flows from
the first and is a part thereof. It pertains to the organization of
self-employers who are such in name only, being in reality, when
viewed from the economic standpoint, nothing else but employees.
They present a grave problem to the unions having organized
workers in the same industrial field for these businessmen, supposedly independent, are in most instances in a much worse economic position than are regular employees, whether organized or
not. They are not covered by workmen's compensation laws, by
unemployment compensation insurance, or by any state or federal
system for social security, and their income is oftentime inferior
to that of employees doing the same type of work. They work at
all hours of the day and night. No paid vacation periods exist
for them and overtime payments are a thing unheard of. Unlike
organized employees, these small self-employers, lacking any effective organization, are unable to bring pressure to bear upon their
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suppliers, who are, in reality, their employers. Their lower working conditions inevitably tend to depress the wage standards and
the employment conditions of workers engaged in the same industry.
Typical of this group are the small filling station operators
who lease their stations from large gasoline supplying companies.
Outwardly, they appear to be independent businessmen. But are
they so in fact? Actually, they form a large sales army designed
to vend, distribute, and channel the products of the affiliated supplier to the consuming public. As such, they are part and parcel
of that company's organization; working under the far-reaching
economic control of a company which is, as can be understood,
interested in the greatest possible sales volume. Their dependence is obvious. The ground on which they live and work is ordinarily owned by the supplier. The equipment which they operate,
that is the pumps and the like, are the company's property. The
advertising material furnished, the gasoline that is sold, emanate
from that company and that company only. Even the sales price
is fixed, the operator's "profit" being the differential between
the price paid and the permissible selling price. Is it not evident
that the true economic status of these operators is that of employees rather than that of independent businessmen? True
enough, under strict application of common-law "control" tests,
they might not be classified as "employees," for the physical
conduct to be performed is not dictated, but such seems hardly
necessary by reason of the stereotyped character of the work
involved. But, like employees, they too do not own the means of
production and furnish only their labor.
Despite the fact that rise of this new class of "independent"
employees is a comparatively recent phenomenon, its existence
has been noted in court decisions and in legal literature. Professor Isaacs, speaking of the peculiar status of these dealers,
dependent in their livelihood upon the large companies whose
wares they sell and distribute, says the wholesaler or manufacturer, whom he calls the "originator of the goods," has a real
interest in what the dealer does with the goods. He notes that
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the originator is concerned with matters such as (1) how the goods
are being displayed and "pushed"; (2) in what condition the
stock is kept; (3) the kind of service given to the consumer; and
(4) what is being done with the developed good will for the originator's brand. 42 As to the dealer himself, he notes that such
individual
feels that he is a part of the originator's organization. He
may advertise himself as an "authorized dealer."
He is
ready to take a good deal of dictation from the originator,
either because that originator exercises discretion in financing
him or because of the value of the "franchise" or privilege
of distributing an originator's much-sought-for product . . .
The originator expects the dealers not merely to sell the
goods, but to maintain a service connected with them for his
customers . . . Dealer-helps of various kinds are to be furnished by the originator according to these contracts; missionary work, various types of advertising, the distribution
of free samples and so forth.
Accordingly, independents have been converted into agents
where the originator has been sufliciently rich and powerful
to accomplish this end by assuming the necessary risks and
43
financial burdens.
Another interesting commentary on the point is provided by
Professor Steffen. He, too, has dealt extensively with this type
of dealer-operator, noting that
the contractor may become a "buyer" and behind the magic
word "sale" it has been possible for the manufacturer to
assert a very great deal of control,-of advertising, of accounting, of sales terms, of quantities to be sold, or methods
of sale and delivery. The dealer's right to territory is usually
contingent upon a certain business being done. And, on the
profit side, not only are the terms of sale to the dealer fixed
by the manufacturer but, practically speaking, those of sale
42 See Isaacs, "The Dealer-Purchaser,"
particularly p. 376.
43 Ibid., p. 383. Italics added.

1 U. of Cinn. L. Rev. 373-87

(1927),
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by dealer to customer as well, the difference being a relatively
fixed and narrow margin which the dealer keeps as his profit,
so-called. Even the "title" of the "buyer" to the goods he
44
sells has become an extremely attenuated thing.
Pointing specifically to the gasoline filling station operators, he
adds:
The case of oil companies needing as they do thousands of
outlets throughout the country, is an example . . . The station
may be owned by the company and "leased" to the operator,
or owned by the company . . . The oil company's advertising
is prominently displayed at the station.4 5
When these factual and economic situations are borne in mind, it
becomes obvious that the so-called "independent operators" are
not self-employers but employees, often more rigidly controlled
and practically always less protected than any employee.
But it is not only in legal literature that notice has been
taken of these facts; the courts, too, have come to grips with the
problem. In the case of National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst
Publications,4" the United States Supreme Court declared that
so-called "independent newspaper vendors," who were furnished
with sales equipment, racks, boxes, change aprons, and advertising
placards, and whose earnings consisted in the difference between
the cost price and selling price of the papers, were not independent
contractors but employees, for the purposes of the National Labor
Relations Act, being regarded as an integral part of the publishers' distribution system and circulation organization. The
importance of that decision lies in the recognition which it grants
to the economic realities of modern business life by which selfemployers, who are such in name only, are recognized to be, in
reality, employees.
A characteristic statement by the court serves to add emphasis
to the point. It said:
In short, when the particular situation of employment com44 Steffen, "Independent Contractor and the Good Life," 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 50132 (1935), particularly pp. 518-9.
45 Ibid., pp. 519-20.
46 322 U. S. 111, 64 S. Ct. 851, 88 L. Ed. 1170 (1944).

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

bines these characteristics, so that the economic facts of the
relation make it more nearly one of employment than of
independent business enterprise with respect to the ends
sought to be accomplished by the legislation, those characteristics may outweigh technical legal classification for purposes
unrelated to the statute's objectives and bring the relation
47
within its protection.
As a consequence, it may be said that one basic idea stands forth,
to-wit: the broad realities of economic life should control the
law of labor relations, rather than the rigid and inflexible scheme
of legal rules and classifications which has been built up in other
areas. Strict legal principles and rules may find useful application in questions over the rights of persons with respect to
inanimate objects; they should not control the changing economic
relations of man to man.
It is true that the Hearst decision is now generally considered
as having been nullified by legislative action, that is by the amendment of the National Labor Relations Act, through the TaftHartley Act, so as to exclude from its coverage any individual
"having the status of an independent contractor." ' 48 Be that as
it may, the fact remains that the United States Supreme Court,
when it had the unfettered opportunity to consider the status of
the small business operator who worked under the far-reaching
and extended control of his supplier, came to the conclusion that
such a person was not a self-employer but an employee.
In another case, that of Fleming v. Demeritt Company,4 9 a
question arose over the applicability of the Fair Labor Standards
Act 5 ° to certain home workers who performed their tasks uncontrolled by any immediate supervision. The workers served a
clothespin manufacturer who furnished machines and materials
necessary for the assembling and packing of clothespins. They
322 U. S. 111 at 128, 64 S. Ct. 851, 88 L. Ed. 1170 at 1183. Italics added.
See also comment on this provision in Van Arkel, op.
cit., p. 4.
49 56 F. Supp. 376 (1944).
50 29 U. S. C. A. § 201 et seq.
47

4829 U. S. C. A. § 152(3).
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were given a specified time in which to complete the work delivered, but were free to work at such times, at such operations,
whether assembling or packing, and in such manner as they
desired. There was no requirement or condition imposed that
the work should be done personally and, as a matter of fact, many
of the home-workers received assistance from other members of
the household and even enlisted the aid of social visitors. The
court therein, referring to the test laid down in Walling v. American Needlecrafts, Inc.,51 declared that the determinative factor in
deciding whether a person was an "employee" within the meaning
of the Fair Labor Standards Act was not the traditional commonlaw test of the employee relationship, influenced by control of
physical conduct in the performance of the service, but rather
whether or not an employee relationship existed in the light of
the history, terms and purposes of the legislation.
Much the same result has been reached by other courts, sometimes even under common law principles. In Gulf Refining Company v. Brown, 52 for example, which was an action for wrongful
death caused by the negligence of a gasoline distributor, the facts
showed that the distributor was under a contract with the gasoline
supplying company obligating him to sell the products of the
company at prices fixed by it. He was required to devote his best
efforts to the sale and distribution of the company's products
and to transmit to the company a monthly statement of sales and
stock on hand. All sales were to be made for cash, unless credit
sales were authorized by the company, and daily statements of
sales and deliveries, with remittance of cash receipts, was stipulated for. On the other hand, the distributor was to have entire
charge of the management and operation of the business, to pay
all license fees, to furnish all necessary equipment, trucks, tank
wagons, and the like, furnish his own helpers and employees, and
pay the expenses of conducting the business. The contract stipulated that the company should not, in any event, be responsible
51132 F. (2d) 60 (1943).
52 93 F. (2d) 870, 116 A. L. R. 449 (1938).
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for the negligence of the distributor or his employees. The court,
however, imposed liability upon the company, saying:
It is pointed out that the contract expressly imposes upon
Ford [the distributor] the entire charge of the management
and operation of the business, the furnishing of equipment
and trucks, and the employment and payment of helpers, for
whose actions, in the conduct of the business, the company
should have no responsibility. This denial to the refining company of any right or power to control the operations of the
business, and this assumption by Ford satisfies, it is said, the
test by which an employee or servant is distinguished from an
independent contractor.
It may be admitted, if we confine our attention to these provisions of the contract, that Ford was constituted an independent contractor . . . but this is to see only a part of the
picture . . . When all the facts are considered, it is seen that
Ford's control over the business was limited indeed and that
it was well-nigh within the power of the company as a practical matter to dictate his every action ... His province was
merely to find customers, make deliveries, and collect the
money...
Some conflict of authority has arisen as to whether the distributor, under such a contract, is an employee of the oil
company, or an independent contractor for whose delicts the
company has no responsibility ... But the decided weight of
authority is to the contrary. Facts like those pointed out
above as indicating a very complete control by the company
of its products during the process of sale and delivery have
been found determinative5 3
Considering, then, the peculiar status these so-called selfemployers have been found to possess, it is only natural that
unions soon began to realize the intrinsic threat which the working conditions of the "independent operators" posed to the
5393 F. (2d) 870 at 872-3. For other cases treating "self-employers" to be
employees, see Louisiana Oil Corp. v. Rayner, 159 Miss. 783, 132 So. 739 (1931),
and Gulf Refining Co. v. Huffman & Weakley, 155 Tenn. 580, 297 S. W. 199 (1927).
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employment standards of union members. It is, therefore, a matter of sheer self-interest and self-protection for unions to attempt
to win these operators over into their organizations, so that the
"self-employers" may conform to union standards. Should such
unionization attempts be deemed an unlawful labor objective?
Should such organizational efforts be defeated by declaring that
the men who are the targets thereof have nothing in common with
employees; that their economic interests lie on a different plane;
that they are, in short, "independent" businessmen, representing
one of the strongest pillars of the free enterprise system? The
answer to such declarations obviously lies in an analysis of their
economic status. It discloses that, actually, they are neither
independent nor business men, are not representative of the free
enterprise system but are even more rigidly controlled and dependent for their very existence upon their suppliers than regular
employees.
If the basic idea of group competition, as recognized by the
highest courts, is accepted and kept in mind, then it follows that
unions should have the right to organize these "independent"
employees so as to get them to adopt and to conform to union
standards. True, some courts would have to discard the preconceived notion that these men are self-employers simply because
they cannot be deemed employees under the strict rules of the
''control" test. 54 The change has been made in situations involving common-law tort liability and in other instances where economic status has been evaluated, assessed and made the deter54 The fallacy of this theory has been pointed out in Nat. Labor Relations Board
v. Hearst, 322 U. S. 111 at 120-1, 64 S. Ct. 851, 88 L. Ed. 1170 at 1179 (1944). Mr.
Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority, there said: "The argument assumes
that there is some simple, uniform and easily applicable test which the courts have
used, in dealing with such problems to determine whether persons doing work for
others fall in one class or the other. Unfortunately this is not true. Only by a long
and tortuous history was the simple formulation worked out which has been stated
most frequently as 'the test' for deciding whether one who hires another is responsible in tort for his wrongdoing. But this formula has been by no means
exclusively controlling in the solution of other problems. And its simplicity has
been illusory because it is more largely simplicity of formulation than of application. Few problems in the law have given greater variety of application and conflict
in results than the cases arising in the borderland between what is clearly an
employer-employee relationship and what is clearly one of independent entrepreneurial dealing. This is true within the limited field of determining vicarious liability in tort. It becomes more so when the field is expanded to include all of the
possible applications of the distinction."
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minative point in deciding the issue. It stands to reason, then,
that the same principle should apply in cases dealing with the
problem of unionization for here, too, economic interests conflict with each other and economic factors form the crux of the
dispute. Thus, it may be stated that whenever the economic
status of the small "self-employer" shows a complete economic
dependence upon his supplier or, to put it in negative form,
does not show the amount of economic independence which is
ordinarily possessed by the average businessman, he should be
treated as an employee and the union should be permitted to attempt to organize him the same as any other employee.
It is realized that criteria based on a degree of economic
dependency will be vague and uncertain, but the economic factors which will play the decisive role in matters of this kind cannot
readily be pressed into the moulds of legal definitions and categories. If courts and attorneys are confronted with concrete
cases, however, the problem of the degree of economic dependency
of the particular self-employed person will not pose grave difficulties and can be ascertained, understood and evaluated from
the particular facts. To mention but one of the criteria which
might be used, the degree of economic dependency could well be
established by ascertaining whether the self-employer owns the
means of production, that is the capital equipment, with which
he earns his livelihood, or whether those means, or an important and integral part thereof, are furnished and owned by the
That suggestion
supplier, he merely contributing his labor.
provides no infallible yardstick, but in many instances it will
fulfill the purpose.
The question might now rightfully be asked as to wherein
lies the difference between the first and the second exception to
the general rule enunciated above; both exceptions seem to stem
from the idea of free competition and the right of unions, as is
true of other groups in society, to engage in peaceful concerted
activities designed to avert the harmful effects of inferior working conditions upon their own higher employment and living
standards. It was previously emphasized that the second ex-
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ception flows from the first, being a part thereof. But there
is this distinction: in cases coming under the first exceptionthe competition between self-employer and union members must
be made apparent, the former's working conditions being demonstrated to contain the potentiality of affecting the latter in an
unfavorable fashion; under the second, the danger from undercutting competition can be presumed and need not be proven
since, by settled economic principles adopted by the courts, the
working conditions of employees, although outwardly parading
as self-employers, will necessarily and vitally affect the wage
and living standards of all workers engaged in the same type of
industry or trade in the community.
The second exception, then, might be stated to be as follows:
Whenever a self-employer actually has the economic status of
an employee, operating and working under such far-reaching
economic control on the part of his supplier that he is more or
less completely dependent for his livelihood upon that supplier,
a union representing the workers in the same trade or industry
may lawfully organize such self-employer without having to prove
the dangerous effect his working conditions will have upon the
employment conditions of the union members, such dangerous
potentiality being presumed to exist.
If concrete applications for the doctrine are needed, the
Wohl5 5 and the Dinoffria 56 cases may serve as good illustrations. The economic status of the bakery goods peddlers in the
Wohl case was clearly that attaching to the employee group.
As distributors, they formed the supplier's sales force. They
handled only the brand manufactured by the supplier at a price
which was fixed by it. The trucks used in distribution were actually the supplier's property despite nominal arrangements for
their sale. Not bound by any contract, the supplier had the power
to dissolve the relationship whenever it pleased. If it did, the
peddler was out of work as completely as would be the case of
any discharged employee.
55 315 U. S. 769, 62 S. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed. 1178 (1942).
56331 Ill. App. 129, 72 N. E. (2d) 635 (1947), writ of error dismissed 399 Ill. 304,
77 N. E. (2d) 661 (1948).
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An even stronger example of a situation in which the second exception could, and should, have found application is afforded by the Dinoffria case. The gasoline station operators
there involved worked under a far-reaching economic control exercised by the large gasoline supplying company from which
they had leased the station, and whose products they were
obligated to sell. The ground on which they operated, the equipment with which they performed their task, was owned by the
company. The price at which they bought and sold the company's products was fixed by it. They used its advertising
materials. The only thing the operators supplied was their labor.
To say these persons were "independent" operators because the
company did not control their physical movements when performing the work magnifies attention upon a small point to the
neglect and disregard of the over-all pattern of the relationship. It is the general economic status, the degree of dependence upon the supplier, which should count rather than some
minor detail isolated from and lifted out of the general texture.
Even under strict control tests, the gasoline station operators there concerned might have been considered employees rather
than independent businessmen. That conclusion can be reached
if attention is given to the fact that the control test finds application not only in those cases where the employee's physical
movements in the performance of his work are actually controlled
by the employer but also in situations where the employer, not
actually exercising such a control, has the right so to do.5 7 As
the gasoline supplier, which owned the filling station equipment,
possessed the right to instruct the operator concerning the manner of handling and using the equipment, it possessed the right
to control, if in fact it did not control, the operator in the physical
performance of his work.5 8
Because the operators there involved called themselves independent, the Illinois Appellate Court was satisfied they were,
§ 220.
The practice of affixing the company's instructions concerning the handling
and use of its equipment to the equipment itself is fairly widespread. Is not that
practice evidence of an asserted right to control the operator's conduct?
57 Restatement, Agency,
58
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failing to take into account either their economic status or the
degree of control exercised over them. The same thing is true
of the Illinois Supreme Court, although it was urged most strongly
to consider the point. 59 It is submitted that the question of the
economic status of the so-called independent operator is one of
the most important factors which should be considered and determined by a court when dealing with the problem of the unionization of self-employers. A mere mechanical approach is not
sufficient, in fact is dangerous, for it fails to take into account
the actualities of modern economic life, judicial aloofness from
which is neither desirable nor appropriate.
There still remains the question whether, realizing that some
self-employers may be so in name only but in reality are employees, the provision of the Taft-Hartley Act outlawing the unionization of self-employers will find application as to them. The
House Labor Committee accompanied the amendment to the National Labor Relations Act with a statement designed to indicate
that statutory terminology was planned to follow along ordinary lines and to possess ordinary meanings.6 0 The Senate Report on that subject is also significant. It states:
The conferees also adopted language in the House bill excluding from the definition of "employee" individuals having the status of independent contractors. While the Board
59 The author wrote the brief petitioning the Illinois Supreme Court for the
issuance of a writ of error in the Dinoffria case. A substantial portion of that
brief was devoted to the point that the "independent" operators involved therein
actually possessed the economic status of employees.
60 H. R. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 18, declares: "It must be presumed
that when Congress passed the Labor Act, it intended words It used to have the
meanings that they had when Congress passed the act, not new meanings that,
years later, the Labor Board might think up. In the law, there always has been
a difference, and a big difference, between 'employees' and 'independent contractors.' 'Employees' work for wages or salaries under direct supervision. 'Independent contractors' undertake to do a job for a price, decide how the work
will be done, usually hire others to do the work, and depend for their income not
upon wages, but upon the difference between what they pay for goods, materials,
and labor and what they receive for the end result, that is, upon profits. It is inconceivable that Congress, when it passed the act, authorized the Board to give to
every word in the act whatever meaning it wished. On the contrary, Congress
intended then, and it intends now, that the Board give to words not farfetched
meanings but ordinary meanings. To correct what the Board has done, and what
the Supreme Court, putting misplaced reliance upon the Board's expertness, has
approved, the bill excludes 'independent contractors' from the definition of
iemployee.'"
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itself has never claimed that independent contractors were
employees, the Supreme Court has . . . held that the ordinary tests of the law of agency could be disregarded by
the Board in determining if petty occupational groups were
"employees" within the meaning of the Labor Relations
Act. The Court consequently refused to consider the question whether certain categories of persons whom the Board
had deemed to be "employees" might not, as a matter of
law, have been independent contractors. The legal effect
of the amendment, therefore, is merely to make it clear that
the question of whether or not a person is an employee is
always a question of law, since the term is not meant to
embrace persons outside that category under the general
principles of the law of agency."
The outstanding feature of the pertinent portions of both of
these reports is the assumption that there is a clear and easily
distinguishable line of demarcation between an "employee" and
an "independent contractor" in the law of agency.
Everybody familiar with that field of law, however, knows
that this is not so, and is aware of the difficulties abounding,
both in judicial decisions and in legal literature, over the definition of the terms "employee," "servant," and "independent
contractor," as well as of attempts to distinguish between them.
Many borderline cases exist which defy ready insertion into established categories, the courts being forced to make decisions
one way or the other to avoid an impasse. Congressional assumption that the "control" test would easily dispose of all of the
difficulties to be encountered had been anticipated by the United
States Supreme Court in the Hearst case and had been effec2
tively answered.
Since the strict control test will not always solve the problem
as to whether a person doing work for others is an employee
or an independent contractor, the question arises whether, ac61 Cong. Rec., June 5, 1947, p. 6599.
62 See excerpt from opinion of Rutledge, J., set out in note 54, ante.
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cepting the declarations made in the Senate and House Reports,
the National Labor Relations Board or a court may still classify
a person as an "employee" although he might be considered to
be more of an independent contractor under agency rules. It
is probable that what the lawmakers intended, in their insistence
upon agency rules as the only applicable test, was the avoidance of arbitrary decisions and the assurance that courts would
determine the issues in accordance with established principles.
It has been heretofore emphasized that, under established principles, persons may sometimes be deemed employees even though
technically not such. It might be said, therefore, that courts are
still free, even under the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act,
to decide, in accordance with those principles, that a man is an
employee although he might not be deemed to be one under the
criteria set up by control tests. A contrary interpretation, far
less sensible as well as restrictive, would require the Board and
the courts, for the purposes of the National Labor Relations
Act only, to apply one set of principles and disregard all other
agency principles when dealing with employee-independent contractor problems. If the broader interpretation be adopted, no
violation of the statute would occur out of union attempts to organize the self-employer who is such in name only.
Returning to the fundamental problem by way of summary,
it may be said that the general rule justifiably should forbid the
attempted organization of self-employers by unions as an unlawful labor objective inasmuch as the working and living standards of union men, in most instances, are neither threatened nor
endangered by the conduct of self-employers. The exceptions
herein suggested, 63 flowing directly from the basic principles upon
which the general rule itself is founded, are just and warranted
63 It is worthy of note that, under these exceptions, the two Illinois cases of
Naprawa v. Chicago Flat Janitors' Union, 315 Ill. App. 129, 43 N. E. (2d) 198
(1942), and Dinoffria v. Teamsters' Union, Local No. 179, 331 Ill. App. 129, 72
N. E. (2d) 635 (1947), were each incorrectly decided. The owner janitor in the
Naprawa case, whom the union was permitted to organize, not only apparently did
nothing of detriment to union janitors but was also clearly outside the economic
status of an employee. The filling station operator in the Dinoffria case, whose
unionization was forbidden, not only had the economic status of an employee but
was actively and effectively competing with union men in a way which endangered
their working and living conditions.
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for they will operate in an area where the unions and their
membership have legitimate cause for concern. Conceding the
point that a number of arguments could be raised against the
ideas here spelled out, it should not be forgotten that "propositions as to public policy rarely are unanimously accepted, and
64
still more rarely, if ever, are capable of unanswerable proof."

64 Holmes, J., in his dissenting opinion to Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92
at 106, 44 N. E. 1077 at 1080, 35 L. R. A. 722, 57 Am. St. Rep. 443 (1896).
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Harold M. Knoth*

i

of a situation quite likely to develop from the relationship of employer and employee is the factually complicated maze revealed in the Illinois case of Velsicol Corporation v. Hyman.' The corporation plaintiff there concerned endeavored to compel the defendant, one of its officers and executive head of its research work, to specifically perform an alleged
agreement to assign to the corporation certain pending patent
applications covering processes discovered by him during the
course of his employment. The suit failed for the reason that
the plaintiff was (1) unable to show that the purported express
agreement was ever signed by defendant, or (2) if so signed, was
unable to give adequate proof to explain its failure to produce
the signed contract. A claim that an implied agreement existed,
growing out of defendant's conduct in making prior assignments
of other discoveries as well as from the fiduciary relationship
present between the parties, likewise failed. Much of the difficulty present in that case would have been eliminated had the
employer been able to produce a formal contract executed by
the parties. It should not be supposed, however, that the presence of such a contract would guarantee success to the employer
whose employee has developed a patentable invention, for there
is room for pitfalls even in the most skilfully devised contractual
language.
LLUSTRATIVE

The purpose of this paper is not so much to re-examine the
general law on the subject but to collate and compare specific
cases involving so-called employment contracts for the purpose
of determining somewhat the extent to which the parties may go
in the accomplishment of their intents and purposes. In some
* LL.B. Member, Illinois and Iowa bars. Registered Patent Attorney. Much
of the material herein previously appeared in a paper by the author published in
Vol. 31, Journal of the Patent Office Society, pp. 532-43 (1949),
Permission to
reprint has been granted by that journal.
1338 Ill. App. 52, 87 N. E. (2d) 35 (1949). Niemeyer, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion. It is understood that leave to appeal has been granted.
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respects, an agreement by which an employee agrees to devote his time to the making of inventions and improvements
for his employer, in exchange for employment and wages or other
remuneration, is similar to an agreement by which a person or
company purchases an invention and seeks to acquire some form
of protective interest in possible improvements on that invention. Although there may be fine distinctions between the two
types of cases, and although slightly different rules may be developed on the basis of the seller's or inventor's future interest
in the enterprise, whether as partner, promoter, official, owner, or
the like, it will be seen that the principles are very much the
same and as easy to apply in one case as in the other.

I. IN

GXNERAL

The general rules governing contracts to assign future inventions undoubtedly follow ordinary contract law that controls
in any case involving agreements to regulate competition, such
as commonly arise in situations where an employee leaves his
employer to seek his fortune alone but in the same or a related field. As a broad proposition, contracts that are unreasonable are unenforcible; that is, if the restraints imposed are unlimited as to time, space or subject matter. The importation of
this rule of reasonableness into the relatively limited field of the
types of agreements considered here, has resulted from a slavish
acceptance of, and adherence to subsequent interpretations of,
the opinion in Littlefield v. Perry;2 although that case does not
actually strike down a contract. Be that as it may, the principle
is sound and has been accepted by authoritative texts. 3 Since
the very nature of the beast requires administration by a court
of equity, the several ramifications and characteristics likely to
develop from individual cases will be made to appear below.
2 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 205, 22 L. Ed. 577 (1875).
3 See, for example, Walker on Patents (Deller's Ed., Baker, Voorhis & Co., New
York, 1937), § 345.

ASSIGNMENT OF FUTURE INVENTIONS

II.

PECULIAR MIScELANEous

CHARACTERISTICS

Although an assignment agreement that is so broad as to be
unreasonable or repugnant to public policy has been rather freely
stated elsewhere to be unenforcible, a court of equity will,
in general, give effect to such agreements as a requisite to the
protection of the employer's business. 4 And a proper agreement will be specifically enforced to require the assignment to
the employer of relevant patents and applications and to enjoin
the employee from conduct calculated to injure his former employer.5 Nevertheless, it is said,6 the contract should be clear
and the acts alleged to have occurred or failed to occur under
it should be convincing. 7 If the agreement is good in part only,
and is divisible under the usual rules, the court may give effect
to the unoffensive part.8
Obviously such an agreement must be supported by a valuable consideration, but it need not involve a separate grant as
would be required for transfer of a patent or a business.9 Salary paid to the employee is sufficient and, unless the contract
calls for further payment, he is entitled to nothing more. 10 A
failure on the part of the employer to make or tender performance precisely at the time and place required will not defeat
his right to have the agreement specifically performed;" although, obviously, the employer's default may be effective to
free the employee.1

2

4 Dry Ice Corp. v. Josephson, 43 F. (2d) 408 (1930); Conway v. White, 9 F.
The mere fact
(2d) 863 (1925); Wege v. Safe-Cabinet Co., 249 F. 696 (1918).
that such litigation involves a patent naturally does not confer jurisdiction on a
federal court: Littlefield v. Perry, 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 205, 22 L. Ed. 577 (1875).
5 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Miller, 22 F. (2d) 353 (1928).
6 Walker, op. cit., § 345.
7 Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F. (2d) 385 (1934), cert. den. 294 U.
S. 711, 55 S. Ct. 506, 79 L. Ed. 1245 (1935).
8 Idem.

9 Lion Tractor Co. v. Bull Tractor Co., 231 F. 156 (1916).
10 Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulator Co., 266 U. S. 342, 45 S.
Ct. 117, 69 L. Ed. 316 (1924), affirming 288 F. 330 (1923).
The employer therein became banklI-Conway v. White, 9 F. (2d) 863 (1925).
rupt, but assignment was nevertheless compelled.
12Brown Perfection Tube Co. v. Brown, 233 F. 676 (1916).
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The agreement need not be in writing, if other conditions
are met, 13 hence it may be either express or implied;' 4 the parties' understanding thereof being evidenced by the fact that the
employee has previously made assignments to his employer. 15
These principles, as well as those hereafter stated, are applicable
to the United States government and its employees, 16 as well as
to other persons.
Attempts of employees to circumvent such agreements have
been as ingenious as they have been numerous. They have not
succeeded by attempting to treat the agreement as a species of
option to the employer to purchase the inventions. 17 Nor may
the employee so bound make related inventions for third persons. 1 8 If the employee, after the termination of his employment, secures a patent including other inventions in addition to
those rightly belonging to his former employer, he may be treated
as one who has wrongfully commingled goods, in this case ideas,
and the burden is on him to establish a contrary situation in his
favor.' 9 On the other hand, a contract will not be construed to
prevent an inventor, after severance of his employment, from
making similar inventions for another, in the absence of conflict
20
with reasonable provisions of the contract.
He may not defend on the ground that the contract contains
no provision for future assignment of patents covering included
inventions, for such covenant will be implied, 2' but the employer
may, at any time, release the employee from his contract, either
13 Magnetic Mfg. Co. v. Dings Magnetic Separator Co., 16 F. (2d) 739 (1927),
cert. den. 274 U. S. 740, 47 S. Ct. 586, 71 L. Ed. 1320 (1927).
14 U. S. v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U. S. 178 and 706, 53 S. Ct. 554 and
687, 77 L. Ed. 513 and 1462 (1933).
See also Goodyear Tire & Rub15 Bowers v. Woodman, 59 F. (2d) 797 (1932).
ber Co. v. Miller, 22 F. (2d) 353 (1928).
16 U. S. v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U. S. 178 and 706, 53 S. Ct. 554 and
687, 77 L. Ed. 513 and 1462 (1933).
17 Hebbard v. American Zinc, Lead & Smelting Co., 161 F. (2d) 339 (1947).
See also Conway
18 New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Singmaster, 71 F. (2d) 277 (1934).
v. White, 9 F. (2d) 863 (1925), concerning the commingling thereof with inventions made before employment.
19 New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Singmaster, 71 F. (2d) 277 (1934).
20 Idem.

21 Littlefield v. Perry, 88 U. S. (21 Wall.)
Safe-Cabinet Co., 249 F. 696 (1918).

205, 22 L. Ed. 577 (1875) ; Wege v.
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generally or for isolated instances, and that release may be
22
either express or implied.
An agreement requiring the assignment of future inventions, even though valid, is not such an instrument as, by statute,
is entitled to recording in the Patent Office, 23 so the recording
thereof does not operate as constructive notice to a subsequent
24
purchaser.
It seems that the respective rights of the parties should be
originally formulated by a proper bi-lateral contract, but in one
2 5 no obcase, that of New Jersey Zinc Company v. Singmaster,
jections were raised to the enforcement of printed instructions
issued to employees subsequent to their employment.
III. PERMISSIBI.

SCoPE

The foregoing has covered briefly the general principles developed by the courts in the application of ordinary law to agreements pertaining to future inventions. There remains for consideration only the requisites of such agreements as to subject
matter-the nature of the inventions involved, and time-the
period covered by the contract.
A.

AS TO SUBJTECT MATTER

It follows from the general rule regarding the unenforcibility
of assignments in gross, that the invention or class of invention
must be kept within or related to the subject matter of the agreement to the extent that such subject matter is either a specific type
of invention or machine or a particular business. In Aspinwall
v. McGill,26 for example, the assignment as to future inventions
and improvements was properly related to the invention ini22 Parker Rust-Proof Co. v. Allen, 231 Mich. 69, 203 N. W. 890 (1924), wherein
the company evinced no interest in the employee's invention, though solicited, until
the employee -had negotiated elsewhere.
2335 U. S. C. A. §47.
24 Eastern Dynamite Co. v. Keystone Powder Mfg. Co., 164 F. 47 (1908).
25 71 F. (2d) 277 (1934). The text of the printed instructions is set out in the
appendix hereto, Case I.
26 32 F. 697 (1887).
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tially purchased, so the court could find no attempt to mortgage
the brain of the inventor. In other cases dealing strictly with
the inventions of employees, no case has been found in which
an objection has been successfully raised against language in
the contract defining the subject matter in terms of its relation
to the employer's present business 27 or to business or matters
in which he may be concerned. 2 8 Obviously, and as a matter of
common sense, an employer would not be expected to limit the
agreement to a specific line of products. Likewise, it would not
be expected that, under general language in such agreement, he
could properly become "interested or concerned" in a new and
unrelated field after and simply because a bound employee made
a valuable invention in such new field. Further, the agreement
is not invalid as to subject matter if it embraces processes, ap29
paratus, and the like, as well as products or machines.
B.

AS TO TIME

This phase of the consideration herein may appear to overlap somewhat the consideration as to subject matter, especially
in so far as it relates to inventions already made. But, since it
concerns the time of making the invention, it is thought to be
properly classified here, as will be seen. In general, inventions
as to time may be made (1) before, (2) during, or (3) subsequent to the period of employment.
In at least four cases, the agreement covered inventions "now
known," ' 30 or "made" ' 31 by the employee. In the United Aircraft cases, 32 the question as to inventions "now known" to
27 See Appendix, Cases A, B, C, D, G, H, and K.
28 Appendix, Cases E and J. Contra: Case L.
29 Appendix, Cases G, H, J, and K.
80 Appendix, Case J.
31 Appendix, Cases B, C, and K.
32 United Aircraft Products Co. v. Warrick, 79 Ohio App. 165, 72 N. E. (2d) 669
(1945) ; United Aircraft Products Co. v. Cruzan, 76 Ohio App. 540, 62 N. E. (2d)
763 (1945). These related cases involved inventors who, originally employed without contract, were ultimately brought under contract. They had made an invention
in the interim. It was determined that the invention came under the contract
since it was "known" at the time of the execution of the contract. See also A. B.
Dick v. Fuller, 198 F. 404 (1912).
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the employee was squarely presented, and in both cases it was
held that the phrase meant inventions known to the employee
at the time of the making of the agreement.
Since the main purpose of an agreement for the assignment
of future inventions is to secure to the employer the requisite
rights in and to inventions made on his time and with his material and by virtue of the employment, no one has questioned
his right to inventions made during the period or term of the
employment, and every contract will contain this or similar lan3
guage.
The most sensitive phase of the time aspect of such agreements is that involving strictly "future" inventions; that is, inventions conceived or made subsequent to the term of employment. Since it may be expected that an inventor cannot open
and close his mind like a book, many contracts include a provision extending the contract beyond the immediate employment
period for a certain length of time. In National Cash Register
Company v. Remington Arms Company,34 a provision extending
the contract for one year beyond the end of the employment was
said to be offensive. The point was not directly involved, however, and the remarks of the court are plainly dicta. A similar
provision was directly presented in the case of Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Company v. Miller 35 and there found not to be objectionable. In one other case, the employer attempted to extend
the contract for five years after the employment period but, the
subject matter of the contract being declared illegal, no consid36
eration was given to validity of the time provision.
33 Even in the absence of language limiting or relating the time of the invention
to the period of employment, the contract may be so construed by the court for
the purpose of taking it out of the broad prohibition of the general rule: Thibodeau
v. Hildreth, 124 F. 892 (1903), affirming 117 F. 146 (1903). The text of the contract appears in Appendix, Case B.
34 242 N. Y. 99, 151 N. E. 144 (1926). See also, Appendix, Case F.
35 22 F. (2d) 353 (1928) ; Appendix, Case G.
36 Lanteen Laboratories, Inc. v. Clark, 294 Ill. App. 81, 13 N. E. (2d) 678 (1938).
The contract of employment, among other things, required the inventors to assign
during the employment period and for five years thereafter. Four years after
leaving the company's employ, the inventors filed an application on a device that
the company thought was within the contract. The trial court found, with the
aid of a patent attorney sitting as a special commissioner, that the invention
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On the basis of what has been set forth above, it appears
that the courts will uphold and enforce any proper and reasonable contract in which the inventions covered are (1) made or
conceived prior to or in the course and during the time of employment or within a reasonable time thereafter, 7 and (2) relate to the particular or general business of the employer or to
8
the purpose for which the agreement was made.
Although it has been shown above that such contracts have
not been declared improper because they included inventions
made before the period of employment 3 9 and extended to inventions relating to subject matter in which the employer "may"
become interested,4 0 neither provision is unequivocally recommended in view of the decision in the case of Guth v. Minnesota
Mining & Manufacturing Company.4 1 This case also places an
apparent limitation on a contract provision that was construed
to extend the employer's rights beyond the term of employment.
Yet, a close analysis of the decision reveals no real conflict
with the general principles outlined above. The late Judge Evans
decided the case on the basis that: (1) the agreement sought to
cover inventions made both before and after the period of employment; (2) the agreement could be extended to business of
the employer's predecessor or successor; (3) it sought to cover
subject matter in which the employer "may be concerned" in
the future; and (4) the contract could not be specifically enforced as long as the employee, upon a proper showing, could
not swear to the oath of the patent application.
of the applicants was not related under the contract and dismissed the bill. No
question was raised as to the five-year extension. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate
Court itself, and for the first time, raised the question of illegality of the subject
matter (birth control devices) and affirmed the decision dismissing the bill.
37 One year, for example: Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Miller, 22 F. (2d) 353
(1928), and Appendix, Case G.
38 This much must be accepted, upon any reasonable construction of any such
agreement. It will be found that equivalent language appears throughout the
cases listed in the Appendix.
39 See Appendix, Cases B, C, and K.
40 See Appendix, Cases E and J. Contra: Case L.
4172 F. (2d) 385 (1934), cert. den. 294 U. S. 711, 55 S. Ct. 506, 79 L. Ed. 1245
(1935).
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Primarily, the contract was held bad to the extent that it
could be construed to require assignment of inventions "hereafter" made, and such construction was resorted to by the court
to support its declaration that, under this contract, "he was,
however, if he worked in another laboratory or for another
manufacturer, required to assign his discoveries to appellee.
4 2
This would effectively close the doors of employment to him."1
This absurd result is avoidable, however, by construing the provision in the light of the limiting phrase "during the period of
my employment," which is quite obviously the real meaning of
the provision, for "predecessor" and "successor" were used to
merely standardize the form of the contract for purposes of possible corporate reconstruction.
The decision does not validly establish the repugnance of the
phrase "or may be concerned" as related to subject matter,
since, as a practical matter, an employer, especially a corporate
employer, constantly adds new products to its business and if
the employee's invention is made after the adoption of such new
product and relates properly thereto, it should be included in the
agreement. A contrary result could require the execution of new
agreements with every expansion of the employer's business.
Ultimately, the court was satisfied that Guth could not make
the oath in the application in suit. Whether such satisfaction
was properly supported is beyond the scope of the present study.
It can be accepted, however, that that is the real basis for the
decision and the general criticism of the agreement was not required. It is interesting to note that of the authorities so copiously4 3 cited by the court, only one4 4 actually held a contract
invalid as being contrary to public policy. The Guth case, then,
can stand for no more than the proposition that equity will not
compel an inventor to execute an oath for a patent application
42 72 F. (2d) 385 at 388.
43 One should not be unduly impressed by the sheer number of authorities cited,
for there are many duplications, some under the guise of parallel citations (c.f.
King v. Gannon, cited in note 3 as 158 N. E. 346 and in note 4 as 54 A. L. R.
1215), and others by separately including the appellate decision and the decision
affirmed (c.f. Thompson v. Automatic Fire Protection Co., 211 F. 120 and again
as 155 F. 548).
44 King v. Gannon, 261 Mass. 94, 158 N. E. 346, 54 A. L. R. 1215 (1927).
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where he properly shows that he believes himself not to be the
first inventor.
The case does not weaken the decisions in the United Aircraft, 45 Goodyear46 or Hebbard 47 cases, nor does it indicate that
the employment contracts therein are in any way defective or
susceptible to attack on the ground that they are unconscionable.
Further, the great weight of authority appears to be that such
contracts must indeed be bad to fail to elicit some response from
the court. Even the court in the Guth case would have enforced
what it said was the reasonable portion of that agreement.

APPENDIX OF AGREEMENTS*
1. NOT OBJECTIONABLE

A.

Aspintwal Mfg. Co. v. McGill (Note 26).
Assignment of patent "together with all improvements
I may hereafter make, without further cost."

B.

Thibodeau v. Hildreth (Note 33).
"... in consideration of such employment .. . and . . .
wages ... agree... that I will give ... full benefit and
enjoyment of any and all inventions or improvements
which I have made or may hereafter make relating to
machines or devices pertaining to said . . . business."

C.

Wege v. Safe-Cabinet Co. (Notes 4, 21).
"all present and future improvements of the safe-cabinet" and "all developments and inventions embodying
any or all of the principles involved [therein] due in
part or altogether" to employee's "talent and labor"
saving to employee "full property rights in all patents
secured by him for inventions in steel or other construction, except as above stated . .

45 See note 32, ante.

4622 F. (2d) 353 (1928).
47 161 F. (2d) 339 (1947).
* Possible controversial language has been underscored for emphasis.
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D.

Parker Rust-Proof Co. v. Allen (Note 22).
"... all rights to . . . any inventions that I may hereafter make while in its employ, in the rust-proofing of
iron and steel . .. "

E.

Contway v. White (Notes 4, 11, 18, 28, 40).
(... all invention.., made ... during the term of ...
employment, which in any way may affect any articles
manufactured by [employer] and used or capable of being used in [employer's] business..."

F.

National Cash Register Co. v. Remington Arms Co. (Note 34).
Agreement required assignment of any invention made
during employment and within year after termination
of employment. Case contains dictum to effect that such
clause is offensive. Compare Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Miller (Appendix, Case G) and Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. (Appendix, Case L).

G.

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Miller (Notes 5, 27, 29, 35, 46).
"... any and all improvements ... during . . . my employment ... or within one year from the termination of
my employment, in respect to: Methods, processes, or
apparatus concerned with the production of any character of goods or materials sold or used by the . . . Company; or (2) in respect to such goods, etc., themselves."

H.

Dry Ice Corp. v. Josephson (Note 4).
"... any inventions or processes which I may at any
time during the course and period of employment by the
[Company] evolve or create relating to Prest-Air devices or Prest-Air Refrigeration, and in and to any patent rights in the United States or elsewhere, which I may
receive or to which I may be entitled by virtue of such
inventions or processes."

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Singmaster (Notes 18, 19, 20, 25).
General instructions issued to employees subsequent to
their employment read: "all patentable ideas and devices originating with, or developed by, an employee of
this Company, while in the employ of the Company, shall
belong to the Company, and shall be assigned to the
Company by the patentee." Note: The inclusion of this
case in the group of cases held not objectionable should
not be construed to indicate general approval of the
practice of issuing such "instructions."
J.

United Aircraft Products, Inc. v. Warrick; Same v. Cruzan
(Notes 28, 29, 30, 32, 45).
"... any and all inventions, discoveries or improvements
in any way relating to aircraft parts and accessories, or
other items of manufacture, manufactured and/or sold
by said company during the term of said employment, or
to processes or apparatus particularly adapted to the
manufacture of such parts, accessories or other items invented by him during the term of said employment, or to
improvements on any such inventions whenever made
by him in the line of work or investigation which the
company is, or may be, engaged in during the term of
said employment, which . . . are now known to the [employee], or discovered or made by the [employee], either
in whole or in part, during the terms of said employment, shall immediately become the absolute property
of the company . . ."

K. Hebbard v. American Zinc, Lead & Smelting Co. (Notes 17,
27, 29, 31, 47).
1"... any and all inventions, discoveries, machines, devices, apparatus, processes or improvements to any thereof, which I have made, discovered or invented, or which
I may hereafter make ... while in the employ of [and]
relating to the business of said company."
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OBJECTIONABLE

Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. (Notes 7, 8, 28, 40, 41).

"(a) . . . all ...

inventions which I have made or conceived, or may at any time hereafter make or conceive
... relating to abrasives, adhesives or related materials,
or to any business in which said company during the period of my employment by said company or by its predecessors or successors in business is or may be concerned,
and (b) . . . inventions which, during the period of my
employment by said company or by its predecessors or
successors in business, I have made or conceived or may
hereafter make or conceive . . . or in the time or course
of such employment, or with the use of said company's
time, material or facilities, or relating to any subject
matter with which my said work for said company is or
may be concerned..."
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ADOPTION-CONSENT OF PARTIES--WHETHER OR NOT CONSENT FOR
ADOPTION GIVEN BY NATURAL PARENT MUST STRICTLY FOLLOW STATUTORY
FORM AND, HAVING ONCE BEEN GIVEN, BECOMES FINAL AND NOT SUBJECT
TO WITHDRWAL-In the case of Petition of Thompson,1 the Appellate
Court of Illinois for the Second District recently had occasion to construe,
for the first time, certain sections of the recently enacted Adoption Act
dealing with the manner and form by which parental consent to adoption
1 Sub nor. Thompson v. Burns, 337 Ill. App. 354, 86 N. E. (2d) 155 (1949).
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is evidenced.2 One Sarah Burns, the natural mother of the child there
involved, executed a written consent for the adoption of her child by the
petitioners. The form was witnessed by a licensed attorney but not one
who had been specifically designated for that purpose. After custody of
the child had been surrendered to the petitioners, proceedings for
adoption were begun. Sarah Burns appeared therein, retracted her consent, and demanded that the child be returned to her, claiming (1) that
such consent was void because not acknowledged in the manner required
by statute, or (2) that she had the right to, and did, withdraw her consent
prior to the time the court acted upon the petition. The trial court,
however, granted adoption by the petitioners. That decree, on direct
appeal taken by the mother,3 was reversed on the ground that the alleged
consent, not being in conformity with the mandatory requirements of the
Adoption Act, furnished no valid ground for a finding that the mother
had consented to the adoption of her child, particularly when such finding
was questioned on direct appeal from the decree. It was further added,
by way of dicta, that a parent has the right to withdraw any consent that
may have been given so long as the withdrawal occurs at any time before
the court has actually acted upon it.
The process of adoption, or the establishment of an artificial parent
and child relationship, being a process unknown to the common law, can
exist only when so authorized by state statute.' In the absence of specified
exceptions not here applicable, the consent of either the natural parent,
the legal guardian, or of an authorized welfare agency is deemed essential
to establish the relation.2 An examination of the various state statutes,
however, would indicate that there is no agreement on the point as to
the form or manner by which this requisite consent must be made
manifest.6 One authority in the field of domestic relations, when discussing
the subject, once grouped the statutes into three categories: (1) those
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 4, § 3--6, reads: "Whenever in this Act, the consent
of any person is required, such consent shall be in writing and shall be acknowledged by the person signing the same in open court, or before the clerk of the
court in which the petition is filed, or such signature shall be witnessed by the duly
authorized probation officer of such court or a representative of a licensed welfare
agency, or by any other person designated by the court." The statute contains further directions as to consents executed outside of Illinois. Section 3-7 provides
that no decree shall be entered, except under designated circumstances, without
such consent.
3 Appeal is permitted by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 4, § 7-2. But see Zacharias,
"Judicial Review of Adoption Decrees," 23 CHicAGo-KENT LAW REVIEw 233-49
(1945).
4 2 C. J. S., Adoption of Children, § 2. An ancient and curious case which might
indicate that the contrary is true, is discussed at length in Zane, "A Mediaeval
Cause Celebre," 1 Ill. L. Rev. 363 (1907).
5 1 Am. Jur., Adoption of Children, § 36.
6 Compare, for example, Deering Cal. Civ. Code 1941, Div. 1, Tit. 2, Ch. 2, § 224m,
with Minn. Stat. Ann. 1945, Vol. 17, Ch. 259, § 259.03.
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which require a signed writing verified by either acknowledgment in open
court, before some authorized person, by being witnessed, or supported
by affidavit; (2) those which require an informal written consent or call
for the presence of the parents in open court; and (3) those which require
no specific form but merely state that the parents must consent. 7 As a
matter of fact, three state statutes do not make specific reference to
consent 8 while one requires that the consent be set out in the petition.'
Of the remainder, some twenty-five fall in the first category, 10 sixteen in
the second,1" and only three in the third.1 2 There is some indication, from
the language of the more recently enacted statutes, of an apparent trend
toward the first or more detailed type of consent which may some day
lead to a nationwide similarity,"a consequently there is justification for
the assumption that the question arising in the instant case is likely to
occur, if it has not already occurred, in a widening range of jurisdictions.
Turning from statutory language to judicial decisions on the point,
it may be noted that the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Idaho in the
case of Vaughn v. Hubbard4 is based on an Idaho statute which requires
7Vernier, American Family Laws (Stanford Univ. Press, California, 1936),
Vol. 4, p. 395, § 260.
8 Fla. Stat. Ann. 1941, Vol. 6, Ch. 72, §,§ 72.01-72.06; Flack, Ann. Code Md. 1939,
Vol. 1, Art. 16; S. C. Code 1942, Vol. 1, § 255(19).
9 Ga. Code 1933, Ch. 74, § 74-402.
10 Ark. Stat. 1947, Tit. 56, Ch. 1, § 56-106; Deering Cal. Civ. Code 1941, Div. 1,
Tit. 2, Ch. 2, § 224m; Del. Rev. Code 1935, Ch. 88, § 2; Ida. Code 1948, Tit. 16,
Ch. 25, § 1601; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 4, § 3-6; Burn's Ind. Stat. Ann. 1933, Vol.
2, Ch. 1, § 3-120; Iowa Code 1935, Vol. 1, Ch. 473, § 10501-3; Ky. Rev. Stat. 1948,
Ch. 405, § 405.200; Dart La. Gen. Stat. 1939, Vol. 3, § 4827; Mich. Stat. Ann. 1943,
Vol. 23, Ch. 266, § 27.3178; Miss. Code 1942, Vol. 2, Tit. 10, Ch. 2, § 1269; Mo. Rev.
Stat. Ann., 1948 Supp., Vol. 20, Ch. 56, § 9609; Neb. Rev. Stat. 1943, Vol. 3, Ch. 43,
§ 104-6; Nev. Comp. Laws 1938, Vol. 4, § 9476; N. J. Stat. Ann. 1939, Tit. 9, Ch.
3, § 9:3-4; McKinney Consol. Laws N. Y. Ann. 1941, Vol. 14, Art. 7, § 112.5; Page
Ohio Gen. Code Ann. 1938, Vol. 7, Ch. 12, § 10512-19; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. 1940,
Vol. 8, Tit. 126, § 126-328; Williams Tenn. Code Ann. 1934, Vol. 3, Ch. 14, § 4733;
Utah Code Ann. 1943, Vol. 1, Ch. 4, § 4; Va. Code Ann. 1942, Ch. 216A, § 5333d;
Vt. Stats. 1947, Ch. 420, §§ 9940 and 9947; W. Va. Code Ann. 1943, Ch. 48, § 4755;
Wis. Stat. 1947, Vol. 2, Ch. 322, § 322.04; Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1945, Vol. 4, Ch.
58, § 58202.
11 Ariz. Code 1939, Vol. 2, Ch. 27, § 27-203; Col. Stat. Ann. 1935, Ch. 4, § 1; Conn.
Gen. Stat. 1949, Vol. 3, Ch. 335, § 6866; Kan. Gen. Stat. 1935, Ch. 38, § 105; Me.
Rev. Stat. 1944, Vol. 2, Ch. 145, § 36; Ann. Laws Mass. 1932, Vol. 6, Ch. 210, § 2;
Rev. Laws N. H. 1942, Vol. 2, Ch. 345, § 2. N. M. Stat. Ann. 1941, Vol. 2, Ch. 25,
§ 23-207; Rev. Code Mont. 1935, Vol. 3, Ch. 9, §§ 5859-61; Gen. Stat. N. C. 1943, Vol.
2, Ch. 48, § 48-5; Okla. Stat. Ann. 1336, Tit. 10, Ch. 2, § 44; Purdon Pa. Stat. Ann.
(perm. ed.), Tit. 1, § § 2-3; Gen. Laws R. I. 1938 Ch. 420, § 2; S. D. Code 1939,
Vol. 1, Ch. 14, § 14-0403 and § 14-0406; Vernon's Tex. Civ. Stat. 1947, Vol. 1, Art.
46a, § 6; Remington's Rev. Stat. Wash. 1932, Vol. 3, Ch. 5, § 1696.
12Ala Code 1940, Tit. 27, Ch. 1, § 3; Minn. Stat. Ann. 1945, Vol. 17, Ch. 259,
§ 259.03; N. D. Rev. Code 1943, Vol. 2, Ch. 14-11; § 14-1104.
13 Vernier's compilation, made in 1936, listed seven states in the third group.
It now contains only three.
The decision turns on what is now Ida.
1438 Ida. 451, 221 P. 1107 (1923).
Code 1948, Tit. 16, Ch. 25, § 1601.
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the presence of the parents in open court if they reside in the county but
authorizes the acceptance of a formal written consent acknowledged before
an authorized officer if they are non-residents thereof. Such an acknowledged consent had been presented to the court in, that case at the
time the adoption decree was granted but the record failed to disclose either
that the parents were present in court or that they were non-residents.
When the decree was subjected to attack some six months later by means
of a petition for habeas corpus, the Idaho Supreme Court struck it down
on the ground that the statutory provisions were mandatory in character
and that strict compliance therewith was essential to establish jurisdiction.
Exclusive of the holding therein, and in the instant case which adopts that
reasoning, only one other reported case, that of Martin v. Fisher," can be
found which deals with the point as to whether or not the consent requirements are mandatory ones.
There is ample authority, however, for what seems to be an established
general rule that where an attempt is made to terminate the natural parent
and child relationship and to substitute the adoptive status in its place,
the statutes must be strictly construed and the specific requirements
thereof must be strictly carried out. 16 Aside from the fundamental concept that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly
construed, the reasoning in support of the rule seems to stem from the
fact that the rights of the natural parents, if not somehow forfeited, are
to be regarded as paramount to those of other persons, hence are in need
of such emphatic protection. Only in Owles v. Jackson,17 a leading Louisiana case, can it be said that the court found sufficient justification for its
adherence to such general rule without making reference to these paramount rights of the natural parents, preferring to rest its decision on
the fact that adoption, being a creature of the law, could be established
only by strict compliance with the law. Although there is no authority
contrary to this general rule, it should be noted that the unanimity of
decision exists only where the effect of the granting of an adoption decree
is to terminate the former parental relationship. If, then, there is no
15 25 Ohio App. 372, 158 N. E. 287 (1927). Although the court there said that the
statute was mandatory, it upheld an adoption decree based on a consent that was
not acknowledged in statutory fashion by saying that the presumption of compliance was not overcome since the consent could have been given in some other

manner.

16 In re McGrew, 183 Cal. 177, 190 P. 806 (1920) ; Vaughn v. Hubbard, 38 Ida.
451, 221 P. 1107 (1923) ; Green v. Paul, 212 La. 337, 31 So. (2d) 819 (1947) ; Zalis
v. Ksypka, 315 Mass. 479, 53 N. E. (2d) 104 (1944) ; In re Whitcomb, 271 App. Div.
11, 61 N. Y. 8. (2d) 1 (1946) ; In re Holder, 218 N. C. 136, 10 S. E. (2d) 620 (1940) ;
In re Rubin's Adoption, 6 Ohio Supp 26 (1941) ; Adoption of Capparelli, 180 Ore.
41; 175 P. (2d) 153 (1946).
17 199 La. 940, 7 So. (2d) 192 (1942).
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such complete break, there may be occasion to doubt the force of such
18
reasoning.
There is no apparent compelling reason, then, why the Illinois court
should see fit, in the instant case, to find the statute to be of mandatory
character, for the statutory wording, although admitting of such construction, does not necessarily demand it." 9 Perhaps the most favorable
aspect of such a finding rests in the fact that it leaves no occasion for
any doubt whatsoever as to the status of the Illinois law on the particular
problem. In spirit, at least, the decision achieves a result in complete
conformity with the majority attitude.
When the Illinois Appellate Court added that the natural parent
had a right to retract the consent at any time before the petition for
adoption had been acted upon by the trial court, it made a clearly
unnecessary statement for, if the consent was invalid, there was nothing
to retract. While the statement may bear scrutiny, it is in agreement
with a rule once followed elsewhere but which, in the light of several
recent cases, is undergoing considerable modification. A clear majority
of the cases on the point do not question the right of a parent to withdraw
a prior consent,' 0 although there is some divergence of opinion as to just
how long this right continues." At one time, only two minority cases
18 The Illinois statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 4, § 5-1, does not purport to
change the rule laid down in Dwyer v. Dwyer, 366 Ill. 630, 10 N. E. (2d) 344
(1937), noted in 16 CHICAGo-KENT REVIEW 198, concerning the duty owed to the
child by the natural parent despite the fact that adoption has taken place. If that
decision still stands, although based on a statute which was repealed at the time

the present statute was enacted, the process of adoption in Illinois cannot be said

to produce a complete termination in the parent-child relationship.
19 The repetition of the word "shall" in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 4, § 3-6, may
connote a legislative desire to insist upon technical compliance, but it has not
always had that effect. Compare, for example, the language in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947,
Ch. 89, § 6a, regarding observance of eugenic provisions as a prerequisite to obtaining a license to marry, and the holding in Boysen v. Boysen, 301 Ill. App.
573, 23 N. E. (2d) 231 (1939), noted in 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 206.
20 In re McDonnell's Adoption, 77 Cal. App. (2d) 805, 176 P. (2d) 778 (1947):
Green v. Paul, 212 La. 337, 31 So. (2d) 819 (1947) ; In re Anderson, 189 Minn. 85,
248 N. W. 657 (1933); Wright v. Fitzgibbons, 198 Miss. 471, 21 So. (2d) 709
(1945) ; Application of Graham, 239 Mo. 1036, 199 S. W. (2d) 68 (1947) ; In re
Cohen, 155 Misc. 202, 279 N. Y. S. 472, 128 A. L. R. 1041 (1935); State ex rel.
Scholder v. Scholder, 22 Ohio L. Rep. 608 (1944); Paschke v. Smith, 214 S. W.
(2d) 205 (Tex. Civ. App., 1948); State ex rel. Towne v. Sup. Ct. for Kitsap
While the case of In re
County, 24 Wash. (2d) 441, 165 P. (2d) 862 (1946).
White's Adoption, 300 Mich. 378, 1 N. W. (2d) 579, 138 A. L. R. 1034 (1942),
allowed withdrawal where the parent had a change of mind, and is commonly
cited as support for the general rule, the court clearly indicated that no vested
rights had intervened.
21 Where there are special statutory periods before a final decree can be entered
or within which a petition for rehearing can be filed, three states allow withdrawal
until the end of that period: Green v. Paul, 212 La. 337, 31 So. (2d) 819 (1947) ;
Re White's Adoption, 300 Mich. 378, 1 N. W. (2d) 579 (1942) ; In re Burke's Adoption, 60 N. Y. S. (2d) 421 (1946). Two states allow withdrawal until the instrument of consent is acted upon: State ex rel. Scholder v. Scholder, 22 Ohio L. Rep.
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clearly held that a parent could not arbitrarily withdraw a prior consent
without just cause.2 2 Several well-reasoned recent decisions, however, have
held that the right to withdraw is not absolute and cannot be exercised
out of the mere whim or caprice of the parent who has previously
consented.2 1 These cases subject the parental right of withdrawal to other
equitable considerations such as those concerning the best interests of the
child and those involving equities arising out of the bona fide acts of the
persons seeking the adoption.
24
In the Kentucky case of Lee v. Thomas, for example, an expectant
mother signed a consent for the adoption of her illegitimate child prior
to its birth, the adopting parents assuming responsibility for the medical
expenses and the care and custody of the child. Some fifteen months later,
when the adopting parents filed a petition for adoption, the natural mother
appeared and sought to withdraw her consent. It was held that she could
not bar the adoption by attempting to withdraw her consent after it had
been acted upon and adoption proceedings had been instituted, especially
so in view of the equities favoring the adopting parents and the evident
service to the child by permitting the adoption.
There is occasion, then, to doubt if the court in the instant case did
a service by taking a stand on a proposition which is far from settled at
a time when such action was not squarely required of it for the purpose
of settling the issues over which it was concerned.
H. H.

BENEDICT

DAMAGES--GROUNDS AND SUBJECTS OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGES--WHETHER OR NOT PAYMENT FOR COVENANT NOT TO SUE, MADE BY ONE
AGAINST WHOM TORT LIABILITY WOULD LIE, MAY BE USED TO MITIGATE
DAMAGES IN SUIT AGAINST ANOTHER WHOSE TORT LIABILITY ARISES FROM
SAME CIRCUMSTANCES-The

plaintiff in Aldridge v. Morris' sued as ad-

608 (1944) ; Paschke v. Smith, 214 S. W. (2d) 205 (Tex. Civ. App., 1948). Three
states allow it before decree or final approval: Application of Graham, 239 Mo.
1036, 199 S. W. (2d) 69 (1947) ; Adoption of Capparelli, 180 Ore. 41, 175 P. (2d)
153 (1946) ; In re Nelms, 153 Wash. 242, 279 P. 748 (1929).
22 Re Adoption of a Minor, 79 App. D. C. 191, 144 F. (2d) 644, 156 A. L. R. 1001
(1944), a case of questionable authority because based on special statutory provisions, and Wyness v. Crowley, 292 Mass. 461, 198 N. E. 758, 138 A. L. R. 1041
(1935).
23 Skaggs v. Gannon, 293 Ky. 795, 170 S. W. (2d) 12 (1943) ; Lee v. Thomas, 297
Ky. 858, 181 S. W. (2d) 457 (1944) ; Kalika v. Munro, - Mass. -, 83 N. E. (2d)
171 (1948) ; Erickson v. Raspperry, 300 Mass. 333, 69 N. E. (2d) 474 (1946);
Adoption of Capparelli, 180 Ore. 41, 175 P. (2d) 153 (1946). The case of French
v. Catholic Community League, 69 Ohio App. 422, 44 N. E. (2d) 113 (1943), does
not follow the earlier Ohio cases for it indicates that the right to withdraw is
conditional.
24297 Ky. 858, 181 S. W. (2d) 457 (1944).
1337 Ill. App. 369, 86 N. E. (2d) 143 (1949). Leave to appeal has been denied.
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ministratrix to recover for the wrongful death of the decedent arising
in a collision between a car driven by the defendant, in which the decedent
rode as a guest, and a truck driven by an employee of an oil company.
Prior to suit, the administratrix had accepted a substantial sum from the
oil company in return for a covenant not to sue. The trial jury, over
objection, was allowed to hear evidence concerning the payment for the
covenant not to sue. Despite this, it found that defendant, while negligent, was not wilfully or wantonly so, as is required before a non-paying
guest can recover from the driver, 2 and judgment passed for defendant.
On plaintiff's appeal therefrom, the lower court judgment was upheld
by the Appellate Court for the Second District on the ground that (1)
the evidence concerning the covenant not to sue was admissible, and
(2) the finding of the jury in defendant's favor was not contrary to the
weight of the evidence. The opinion of the court, written by Bristow, J.,
considered the fundamental issue to be "whether the covenant not to sue,
entered into between plaintiff and the oil company should have been
introduced in the proceedings." After a thorough analysis of the Illinois
cases in point, the court noted that Illinois decisions have been cited as
authority on both sides of the question, 3 found that unimportant factors
have been used as bases for some of the decisions, and came to a wellreasoned conclusion that such factors were without sound support and
should not be followed.
That a release given to one of two or more joint tort feasors will
serve to release all is well settled.4 Difficulty arises, however, in determining whether the consideration furnished by one of the tort feasors
was given for a release or merely for a covenant not to sue.' As the latter
does not serve to bar suit against the remaining tort feasors, a number
of states, including Illinois, 7 have held that the intention of the parties
is controlling on the point.8 Once it has been ascertained that the agreement made is actually a covenant not to sue, the problem of the instant
case will arise, that is what should be the effect of such a covenant upon
the covenanter's action against a third person whose tort liability grows
out of the same circumstances?
2Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95Y2, § 58a.

3 See annotation in 104 A. L. R. 926 to the New Jersey case of Brandstein v.
Ironbound Transportation Co., 112 N. J. L. 585, 172 A. 580 (1934), particularly pp.
932 and 941.
4 Mooney v. City of Chicago, 239 Ill. 414, 8 N. E. 194 (1909) ; Welty v. Laurent,
285 Ill. App. 13, 1. N. E. (2d) 577 (1936). In general, see 23 R. C. L. Release,
§§ 35-6, and 66 A. L. R. 206.
5 See note in 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 503 (1930).
6 45 Am. Jur., Release, § 4.
7 Chicago & Alton Ry. Co. v. Averill, 224 Ill. 516, 79 N. E. 654 (1906); Reams
v. Janoski, 268 Ill. App. 8 (1932).
8 45 Am. Jur., Release, § 37.
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In the settlement of that problem, it may be noted that the great
weight of authority in this country holds that evidence concerning the
consideration received for the covenant not to sue may be introduced in
evidence in a suit against the other joint tort feasor and the jury may
be instructed to deduct, from any award made to plaintiff, the amount
so received.' A fair number of the Illinois decisions fall in line with this
majority view, commencing with the case of City of Chicago v. Babcock.'0
Actually, the court there decided that a jury finding to the effect that
a purported release was really a covenant not to sue was binding, hence
did not serve to exculpate the defendant. By way of comment, however,
the court remarked that the moneys paid for such a covenant might well
be used to reduce the amount of damages assessed against the other joint
tort feasor. Whether the jury did or did not so consider the covenant
was not questioned. Ten later Illinois decisions, more than a proportionate
share of the cases on the subject, have picked up and applied the dictum
so pronounced. 1
Decisions which adhere to the opposite view base the refusal to allow
evidence of the covenant to be offered in mitigation on a variety of grounds.
The first view, really a reiteration of the prevailing viewpoint, becomes
operative whenever the court finds that the party furnishing the con9 McKenna v. Austin, 134 F. (2d) 659 (1934); Steenhuis v. Holland, 217 Ala.
105, 115 So. 2 (1927); Storey v. Breedman, 5 Alaska 468 (1916); Dwy v. The
Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 92 A. 883 (1914); Ballick v. Philadelphia Products
Co., Inc., 5 Harr. 74, 162 A. 776 (Del., 1932) ; Caplan v. Caplan, 62 Ga. App. 577, 9
S. E. (2d) 96 (1940) ; Parry Mfg. Co. v. Crull, 56 Ind. App. 77, 101 N. E. 756 (1913) ;
Miller v. Beck, 108 Iowa 601, 79 N. W. 344 (1899) ; Louisville Gas & Electric Co.
v. Beaucond, 188 Ky. 725, 224 S. W. 179 (1920) ; McCrillis v. Hawes, 38 Me. 566
(1854); Bogdahn v. Pascagoula St. Ry. & Power Co., 118 Miss. 668, 79 So. 844
(1918); Karcher v. Burbank, 303 Mass. 303, 21 N. E. (2d) 542 (1939) ; Knoles v.
Clark, 236 Mo. App. 1162, 163 S. W. (2d) 369 (1942) ; Meinecke v. Intermountain
Trans. Co., 101 Mont. 315, 55 P. (2d) 680 (1936) ; Mason v. Stephens, 168 N. C.
370, 84 S. E. 527 (1915); Colby v. Walker, 86 N. H. 568, 171 A. 774 (1934);
Lombardo v. Creamer, 113 N. J. L. 117, 172 A. 584 (1934); Fidel v. Brooklyn &
Queens Transit Corp., 242 App. Div. 791, 274 N. Y. S. 796 (1934) ; Adams Express
Co. v. Beckwith, 100 Ohio St. 348, 126 N. E. 300 (1919) ; City of Tulsa v. McIntosh,
90 Okla. 50, 215 P. 624 (1923); McKay v. Pacific Bldg. Materials Co., 156 Ore.
578, 68 P. (2d) 127 (1937); Hunt v. Aufderheide, 330 Pa. 362, 199 A. 345
(1938); Finlay v. Plante, 52 R. I. 325, 160 A. 865 (1932); Bradshaw v. Baylor
University, 126 Tex. 99, 84 S. W. (2d) 703 (1935); Chamberlin v. Murphy,
41 Vt. 110 (1868) ; Stusser v. Mutual Union Ins. Co., 127 Wash. 449, 221 P. 331
(1923) ; Natrona Power Co. v. Clark, 31 Wyo. 284, 225 P. 586 (1924) ; New River
& Pocahontas Cons. Coal Co. v. Eary, 115 W. Va. 46, 174 S. E. 573 (1934) ; Abraham
v. Clark, 202 Wis. 451, 232 N. W. 865 (1930).
10 143 Ill. 358, 32 N. E. 271 (1892).
11 Garvey v. Chicago Railways Co., 339 Il1. 276, 171 N. E. 271 (1930) ; Bejnarowicz
v. Bakos, 332 Ill. App. 151, 74 N. E. (2d) 614 (1947) ; Stoewsand v. Checker Taxi
Co., 331 Ill. App. 192, 73 N. E. (2d) 4 (1947); Rather v. City of Chicago, 298
Ill. App. 625, 19 N. E. (2d) 451 (1939) ; Gore v. Henrotin, 161 Ill. App. 110 (1911) ;
Chicago & Alton Ry. Co. v. Averill, 127 Ill. App. 275 (1906) ; Brennan v. Electric
Installation Co., 120 Ill. App. 461 (1905) ; City of Chicago v. Smith, 95 Ill. App.
335 (1900) ; Chicago & E. I. Ry. Co. v. Hines, 82 Ill. App. 488 (1898), affirmed in
183 Ill. 482, 56 N. E. 177 (1899), without comment upon point in question.
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sideration and the party being sued are not, in fact, joint tort feasors 2
but are independent actors.13 As the general rule allowing mitigation is
designed to apply only where joint liability is involved, that rule is clearly
inappropriate for use in such cases. Three of the Illinois cases have been
decided squarely on this proposition. In Scharfenstein v. Trust City
Knitting Company, 4 for example, mitigation was disallowed when it
appeared that the parties concerned were not joint tort feasors, albeit
the court said that even joint tort feasors were not entitled to mitigation.
In Skillman v. McDowell," a proceeding under the Dram Shop Act,"
the dram shop keeper was denied an opportunity to show that the plaintiff,
his customer, had received money from another patron for a covenant not
to sue because the defendant's liability was treated as being distinct and
separate from that of the patron.' 7 As recently as 1948, the Illinois
Supreme Court, in the case of McManaman v. Johns-Manville Products
Corporation,' also disallowed mitigation on much the same grounds,
treating the parties concerned as not being joint tort feasors.
Other cases which refuse to allow mitigation do so on the ground that
the granting of a covenant not to sue is purely a personal matter between
the immediate parties with no portion of the transaction inuring to the
benefit of another. As such parties are to be fully protected in their right
to make any lawful contract they please, it has been conceived that their
intention is to regard the sum paid for the covenant as not being designed
to satisfy any part of the plaintiff's claim against the defendant. The
intention so discovered has, as a necessary concomitant to the premise
on which it is based, been enforced in cases such as Nashland Interurban
Railway Company v. Gregory.9 A Minnesota court, in an erroneous belief
that such view had been applied "in a multitude of cases, "20 wherein full
recovery had been granted against the other person jointly liable, saw
fit to follow the Tennessee view so expressed. In direct opposition to the
12 That the rule as to just what parties are joint tort feasors is not settled, see
Prosser, "Joint Torts and Several Liability," 25 Cal. L. Rev. 413 (1937).
13 Payments made by employer to plaintiff-employee have been excluded in Town
of West Hartford v. Willets, 125 Conn. 266, 5 A. (2d) 13 (1929) ; Gulf Refining Co.
v. Jackson, 250 S. W. 1080 (Tex. Civ. App., 1923); Grimm v. Globe Printing Co.,
232 S.W. 676 (Mo. App., 1921).
14253 Ill. App. 190 (1929).
15317 Ill. App. 85, 45 N. E. (2d) 574 (1942).
161ll. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 43, § 94 et seq.
17 But see Manthei v. Heimerdinger, 332 Ill. App. 335, 75 N. E. (2d) 132 (1947),
noted in 26 CmcAGo-K-NiT LAw RmIEW 358, to the effect that such distinction does
not hold true where a general release is given.
18 400 Ill. 423, 81 N. E. (2d) 137 (1948).
19 137 Tenn. 422, 193 S.W. 1053 (1917).
20 Musolf v. Duluth Edison Electric Co., 108 Minn. 369 at 378, 122 N. W. 499 at
503 (1909).
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attitude that the covenant is a matter of concern solely to the contracting
parties, is the viewpoint expressed in a few cases which hold that the
defendant may not only take advantage, by way of mitigation, of the
consideration given for the covenant when paid by a joint tort feasor
but may also use proof of money paid by independent tort feasors and
even by persons not, in fact, liable. 21 As a Utah court recently stated that
concept, it would ill become "one who has forced another to pay him
damages for injuries he has received to argue that he did so in bad faith,' '22
hence he must allow proof of such payments in favor of all others involved.
Relatively few cases have considered the impact such evidence might
have upon the jury. In the Nebraska case of Tankersley v. Lincoln
Traction Company,23 it was the defendant who objected to the introduction
of evidence concerning amounts received by the plaintiff for a covenant
not to sue, despite the fact that such proof would seemingly redound to
its benefit. The court agreed with the objection, holding that it was error
to allow such proof in evidence because it would be apt to cause the jury
to "assume that the non-settling defendant was liable for the same amount
of damages." 2' 4 The logic would seem unsound, but it is reflected in the
Illinois case of Devaney v. Otis Elevator Company,25 often cited as
evidencing an adherence to the minority view, where the court said that,
inasmuch as the covenantee was not a party to the suit, it was improper
for the jury to consider the effect of any agreement it might have made
with the plaintiff. It may be noted, however, that no reversal was granted
therein for the instruction was not regarded as prejudicial to a defendant
who would stand to benefit from that proof. 26

The point does not seem

to have been pressed too strongly and the ultimate decision may be
justified on the ground that the covenantee, who was the plaintiff's
employer, was not really a joint tort feasor.
The decision in the instant case attempts to place the Illinois law
on a sound basis, squaring it with the weight of authority. The only
distracting feature lies in the fact that the whole discussion is beside
the point for the jury found that the defendant had not acted in the
21 Husky Refining Co. v. Barnes, 119 F. (2d) 715 (1941) ; Young v. Anderson, 33
Ida. 522, 196 P. 193 (1921) ; Jacobsen v. Woerner, 149 Kan. 598, 89 P. (2d) 24
(1939); Bailey v. Delta Elec. Light, Power & Mfg. Co., 86 Miss. 634, 38 So. 354

(1905); El Paso & S. R. Co. v. Darr, 93 S. W. 166 (Tex. Civ. App., 1906).
22

Green v. Lang Co., Inc., -

Utah -

at -,

206 P. (2d) 626 at 627 (1949).

23101 Neb. 578, 163 N. W. 850 (1917).

24 101 Neb. 578 at 584, 163 N. W. 8t50 at 852.
25251 Ill. 28, 95 N. E. 990 (1911).
26 Much the same rationale appears to have been followed in Caruso v. City of
Chicago, 305 Ill. App. 571, 27 N. E. (2d) 545 (1940), and in Onyschuk v. Sharkey,
277 Ill. App. 414 (1934), where the court felt that the defendant had the benefit
of the proof even though no special instruction was given on the point.
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wilful and malicious fashion necessary to support a recovery. As the
court approved that finding, it follows that plaintiff could recover nothing
from the defendant. Being without such right of recovery, there could
never be damages assessed against the defendant from which to deduct
the money plaintiff received for his covenant not to sue. The question
of the effect of such covenant, then, was not before the court for purpose
of comment.
E.

A. WARMAN

DIVORCE-OPERATION AND EFFECT OF DIVORCE AND RIGHTS OF DIVORCED

PERSONS-WHETHER

A

DIVORCE DECREE BY

COURT

HAVING

PERSONAL

JURISDICTION OF BOTH PARTIES ABROGATES A PRIOR SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
2

DECREE OF ANOTHER STATE--That Sherrer v. Sherrerl and Coe v. Coe

have done little to clarify the question of the effect of an out of state
divorce on a local separate maintenance decree is the disappointing conclusion to be drawn from two recent cases. One of these cases, that of
Buck v. Buck,' came before the Illinois Appellate Court for the First
District. It appeared therein that, for some twenty years prior to 1943,
Lillian Buck and Gordon Buck had lawfully cohabited as husband and
wife in Illinois. In that year, Lillian obtained a decree of separate maintenance from an Illinois court on the ground of her husband's willful
desertion. The following year, he went to Nevada, remained the required
six weeks, and filed a divorce action charging extreme cruelty. His wife
followed him to Nevada and filed a sworn answer as well as a cross
complaint for divorce alleging desertion. The Nevada court awarded the
decree to Lillian, approving a property settlement which had been arranged
by the parties and a support allowance. Both parties returned to Illinois.
Lillian thereafter filed a petition seeking an increase in the monthly
award under the prior Illinois decree. The ex-husband, as a defense to
that action, raised the effect of the Nevada proceeding and of Lillian's
participation therein. Lillian's reply questioned the jurisdiction of the
Nevada court and alleged that fraud had been practiced upon that court
and upon her by the defendant. Upon appeal from a decree adverse to
Lillian, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the require.
ments of full faith and credit, as laid down in the Sherrer and Coe cases,
precluded any collateral attack upon the Nevada decree inasmuch as the
defendant therein had filed an appearance and had submitted to the
jurisdiction of that court, thereby nullifying the operation of the earlier
Illinois decree.
1334 U. S. 343, 68 S. Ct. 1087, 92 L. Ed. 1429, 1 A. L. R. (2d) 1355 (1948).
2334 U. S. 378, 68 S. Ct. 1094, 92 L. Ed. 1451, 1 A. L. R. (2d) 1376 (1948).
3 338 Ill. App. 179, 86 N. E. (2d) 415 (1949).
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In the other case, that of Lynn v. Lynn,4 the Appellate Division of
the New York Supreme Court, two justices dissenting, reached an opposite
result on somewhat similar facts. Jay Lynn, having been an unsuccessful
defendant in a New York bed and board suit, went to Nevada to establish
residence and filed a divorce suit against his wife Lillian charging cruelty.
Lillian followed, filed an answer denying the allegations of cruelty and
questioning the genuineness of her husband's Nevada residence. By way
of a separate defense, she set up the prior New York adjudication. The
Nevada court found for the husband and entered a decree of divorce in
his favor, omitting therefrom any reference to support. Both parties
returned to New York. Payments under the bed and board separation
were continued for some five years. At that time, Lillian applied to the
New York court for an increase in the payments. As a defense to that
action, Jay pleaded the Nevada divorce and Lillian's participation therein.
This defense was sustained by the trial court but, on appeal, the Appellate
Division reversed, holding that the ex-wife's appearance in the Nevada
divorce proceeding did not destroy her right to support under the earlier
New York decree.
The problem evidenced in these two cases is not a new one. During
5
the comparatively tranquil reign of Haddock v. Haddock, under which
each state was left to determine for itself the effect an out of state divorce
would have on its residents, it became generally recognized that, where
both parties appeared in the out of state divorce proceeding before a
court of competent jurisdiction, such decree was not subject to collateral
attack.6 Where a prior decree for separate maintenance was involved,
however, the result was not so clear. If the wife had previously obtained
a separate maintenance decree in one state and later personally appeared
in her spouse's out of state divorce action, a question would arise as to
whether she had thereby lost her right to separate maintenance under the
earlier decree. Some states held that she did.' This result was reached,
in some jurisdictions, even where the out of state divorce was of ex parte
Cohn, J., wrote a dissenting
4 275 App. Div. 269, 88 N. Y. S. (2d) 791 (1949).
opinion, concurred in by Van Voorhis, J.
5 201 U. S. 562, 26 S. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867, 5 Ann. Cas. 1 (1906).
6 See collection of cases in the annotation to Chanblin v. Chanblin, 362 Ill. 588,
1 N. E. (2d) 73 (1936), in 104 A. L. R. 1183, and Guggenheim v. Wahl, 203 N. Y.
390, 96 N. E. 726 (1910) ; Strauss v. Strauss, 122 App. Div. 729, 107 N. Y. S. 842
(1907) ; French v. French, 74 Misc. 626, 131 N. Y. S. 1053 (1911).
7 Bloedorn v. Bloedorn, 76 F. (2d) 812 (1935) ; Rosa v. Rosa, 296 Mass. 271, 5
N. E. (2d) 417 (1936) ; Scheinwald v. Scheinwald, 231 App. Div. 757, 246 N. Y. S.
33 (1930) ; Richards v. Richards, 87 Misc. 134, 149 N. Y. S. 1028 (1915) ; Gilbert
v. Gilbert, 83 Ohio St. 265, 94 N. E. 421 (1911), reversed on other grounds in 108
N. E. 1121 (1911) ; Comm. v. Parker, 59 Pa. Super. 74 (1915).
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character, 8 although the general rule would seem to have been that an
ex parte proceeding could have no such effect,9 the existence or nonexistence of personal jurisdiction being deemed the determining factor.1"
Other courts, by contrast, held that even a personal appearance by the
wife and a plea to the merits would not waive her rights under the
previous order." The first federal clarification of the issue came with
Davis v. Davis.12 The Supreme Court, in that case, held that the wife's
contest of her husband's Virginia divorce proceeding on the merits, even
though termed a special appearance, he being properly domiciled in that
state, had resulted in entitling the Virginia decree to full faith and credit
in any action brought in another state.
Although the Davis case was a step in the right direction, conflicting
state decisions thereafter evidenced that much remained to be done before
uniformity could be attained. Nor did the two celebrated cases of Williams
v. North Carolina" offer a solution. While the effect of these cases was to
require each state to give full faith and credit to a foreign ex parte
divorce, if rendered on proper jurisdictional bases, it failed to determine
the effect that divorce would have on personal obligations arising from the
marital status such as the husband's duty to support.
Those states which sought to retain whatever was possible from the
Haddock rule held that, where the wife had sought no affirmative relief
under her personal appearance, the foreign decree could have no effect
upon a prior separate maintenance decree 4 although admitting that it
would be conclusive if it incorporated a prior settlement,'5 particularly
8 Harrison & Saunders v. Harrison, 20 Ala. 629 (1852) ; Cardinale v. Cardinale,
8 Cal. (2d) 762, 68 P. (2d) 351 (1937); McCormick v. McCormick, 82 Kan. 31,
107 P. 546 (1910); McCulTough v. McCullough, 203 Mich. 288, 168 N. W. 929
(1918) ; Herrick v. Herrick, 55 Nev. 59, 25 P. (2d) 378 (1933).
9 Basset v. Basset, 141 F. (2d) 954 (1944) ; Simonton v. Simonton, 40 Ida. 751,
236 P. 863 (1925) ; Miller v. Miller, 200 Iowa 1193, 206 N. W. 262 (1925); Dory
v. Dory, 248 Mass. 359, 142 N. E. 774 (1924); Metzger v. Metzger, 32 Ohio App.
202, 167 N. E. 690 (1929).
10 Bennett v. Tomlinson, 206 Iowa 1075, 221 N. W. 837 (1928) ; West v. West,
114 Okla. 279, 246 P. 599 (1926).
11 Harding v. Harding, 198 U. S. 317, 25 S. Ct. 679, 49 L. Ed. 1066 (1905);
Lednum v. Lednum, 85 Col. 374, 276 P. 674 (1929) ; Kelly v. Kelly, 118 Va. 376, 87
S. E. 567 (1916).
12 305 U. S. 32, 59 S. Ct. 3, 83 L. Ed. 26, 118 A. L. R. 1518 (1938).
13317 U. S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279, 143 A. L. R. 1273 (1942), and 325
U. S. 229, 65 S. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 1577, 157 A. L. R. 1366 (1945).
14 In Manney v. Manney, 42 Ohio L. Abs. 153, 59 N. E. (2d) 755 (1944), the court
distinguished the case before it from the earlier case of Gilbert v. Gilbert, 83 Ohio
St. 265, 94 N. E. 421 (1911), on the basis that no affirmative relief had been sought.
15 Schacht v. Schacht, 295 N. Y. 439, 68 N. E. (2d) 433 (1946) ; Senor v. Senor,
187 Misc. 856, 65 N. Y. S. (2d) 603 (1946), affirmed in 297 N. Y. 800, 78 N. E. (2d)
20 (1946) ; In re Jarunek, 267 App. Div. 607, 47 N. Y. S. (2d) 625 (1944) ; Graham
v. Hunter, 266 App. Div. 576, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 717 (1943).
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so as to all parties who personally appeared.1 6 Closely associated with this
line of cases are those which hold that, even after personal appearance,
the jurisdictional question may be reopened if there is no positive finding
of its existence by the out of state court.17 Other states, reaching a different
result, held that the personal appearance of the defendant made the decree
effective not only for all that was litigated but for all that might have
been litigated, providing the court had proper jurisdiction of the res.18
The matter eventually came to the United States Supreme Court
through the case of Estin v. Estin.'9 The court there held, two justices
dissenting, that an out of state ex parte divorce could have no effect on
a prior separate maintenance decree of another state. That result was
reached on the theory that no court, without personal jurisdiction, could
determine personal rights and obligations. The principle of "divisible"
divorce was thus laid down. 21 On the same day the court decided the
2
Estin case, it handed down the decisions in the Sherrer and Coe cases. '
The problem was again essentially that of the Estin case except that there
had been personal appearance by both parties in the out of state proceeding. Because of that personal appearance, the court held that any failure
by the party defendant to contest the jurisdiction of the court was no
one's fault but his own and that failure could not serve to provide the
basis for a subsequent attack on the decree before the courts of a sister
state. The doctrine of the Davis case, which had been interpreted as
requiring a contest of jurisdiction, 22 was thereby broadened and, insofar
as it was in conflict with the holding in Andrews v. Andrews, 2 the latter
2 4
case was expressly overruled.
It is not possible, at this time, to draw any decisive conclusions as to
how state courts will apply the doctrines of the Estin, Sherrer and Coe
16 Matter of Lindgren's Estate, 293 N. Y. 18, 55 N. E. (2d) 849
1Marigny v. DeMarigny, 193 Misc. 189, 81 N. Y. 8. (2d) 228 (1948).
17 Cohen v. Cohen, 319 Mass. 31, 64 N. E. (2d) 689, 163 A. L. R.
Giresi v. Giresi, 137 N. J. Eq. 336, 44 A. (2d) 345 (1946) ; Isserman
23 N. J. Misc. 174, 42 A. (2d) 642 (1945), reversed on other grounds

(1944); De362 (1946)
v. Isserman,
in 138 N. J.

Eq. 140, 46 A. (2d) 799 (1946).
18 Ex parte Jones, 249 Ala. 386, 31 So. (2d) 314 (1947) ; Taylor v. Burdick, 320
Mich. 25, 30 N. W. (2d) 418 (1948) ; Keller v. Keller, 352 Mo. 877, 179 S. W.
(2d) 728 (1944).
19334 U. S. 541, 68 S. Ct. 1213, 92 L. Ed. 1561, 1 A. L. R. (2d) 1412 (1948).
20 Mr. Justice Douglas noted that the "result in this situation is to make the
divorce divisible--to give effect to the Nevada decree insofar as it affects marital
status and to make it ineffective on the issue of alimony." See 334 U. S. 541 at
549, 68 S. Ct. 1213 at 1218, 92 L. Ed. 1561 at 1569.
21 See notes I and 2, ante.
22 Cohen v. Cohen, 319 Mass. 31, 64 N. E. (2d) 689, 163 A. L. R. 362 (1946).

23 188 U. S. 14, 23 S. Ct. 237, 47 L. Ed. 366 (1903).
24 See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343 at 353, 68 S. Ct. 1087 at 1092, 92 L.
Ed. 1429 at 1437, 1 A. L. R. (2d) 1355 at 1363 (1948).
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cases. Collectively they seem to lay down a middle road of decision which,
if followed by state tribunals, would result in a greater degree of uniformity than has heretofore been the case, a result eminently desirable.
Thus a state, although required by the Williams doctrine to give full faith
and credit to an out of state ex parte divorce insofar as it operates upon
the res, might properly assert its interest in the financial welfare of its
own domiciliaries by a refusal to recognize such a decree as operative
upon personal rights or liabilities of the party not present; a result
consistent both with the Williams case and the holding in Pennoyer v.
Neff. 25 To require recognition of a personal decree based upon personal
appearance would seem to be a mere corollary of the rule rather than an
unwarranted extension.
The Illinois court, in deciding the Buck case, adhered to these
principles. While it must be admitted that Lillian Buck sought affirmative
relief in the Nevada proceeding, her action was not made the basis of the
decision. Quoting extensively from the Sherrer case, the Illinois court
affirmed the principle that, where a court has personal jurisdiction of the
parties and of the res, the result of that hearing will be res judicata not
only concerning what was in fact litigated but also as to what might have
been so litigated. 26 The Illinois court, therefore, felt bound to accord full
faith and credit to the Nevada decree, a holding which, it is to be hoped,
will become the accepted interpretation of the Sherrer and Coe cases.
The New York court, reaching the opposite result in the Lynn case,
recognized the compelling effect of the Williams doctrine as to the full
faith and credit which had to be accorded to the Nevada decree insofar
as it affected the marital status, but seized upon the "divisible" divorce
doctrine of the Estin case in order to prevent it from having any effect
on the New York separate maintenance decree. In an effort to buttress
the logic of that decision, the court leaned upon the fact that, there being
no provision for support of the wife in the Nevada decree, that decree
was not entitled to full faith and credit in New York because it had failed
to give full faith and credit to the earlier New York decree. The court
also relied upon the paramount interest of New York in the maintenance
of the validity of its judgments as to matrimonial matters as well as the
public policy of that state regarding divorce. In effect, the New York
court said that, as the Estin case had given birth to the principle of divisible divorce, while it was constrained by the Williams case to recognize
95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1878).
26 Ex parte Jones, 249 Ala. 386, 31 So. (2d) 314 (1947) ; Godschalck v. Weber,
25

247 Ill. 269, 93 N. E. 241 (1910); Pratt v. Mridima, 311 Mich. 64, 18 N. W. (2d)
279 (1945), cert. den. 326 U. S. 739, 66 S. Ct. 49, 90 L. Ed. 441 (1945); Keller
v. Keller, 352 Mo. 877, 179 S. W. (2d) 728 (1944) ; Morrisey v. Morrisey, - N. J.
Eq. -, 64 A. (2d) 209 (1949).
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the effect of the decree on the marital status, there was nothing to compel
it to accept that part of the decree which purported to operate in personam.
A blind following of the New York view would provide the impetus
to turn an already confused problem into one of even greater confusion.
Under it, no out of state divorce, despite complete jurisdiction both in rem
and in personam, would be completely effective in a restrictive state of
domicile of one of the parties. The litigant in such a suit, while everywhere
recognized as divorced, would have to be, for purpose of the support of
his ex-wife, regarded as a married person. Whether the forward-looking
attitude of the Illinois court or New York's attempt to salvage whatever
is left from the doctrine of the Haddock case will become the generally
accepted attitude is a problem now in need of solution. Perhaps the only
solution will be in another case of the import of Williams v. North
27
Carolina.
It is appropriate, at least, to recall the prophesy Professor
Holt made in 1943. He wrote: "Yet the bones of Haddock v. Haddock
remain-unbleached and unpulverized . . . so courts in states that do
not favor free and easy termination of marriage may still find in the
ossious remains of the Haddock case material to fashion some puzzles for
the Supreme Court of the United States to solve--puzzles upon which law
students and their teachers in the meantime may speculate. '2'
G. E. ELMORE
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EXTENDED BY VIRTUE OF EXERCISE OF OPTION TO RENEW SAME LEASE.-

In the recent case of Hindu Incense Manufacturing Company v. MacKenzie,' the Illinois Supreme Court was called upon, for the first time,
to determine whether an option to purchase, as contained in a lease, was
continued into a renewal term by virtue of the exercise of an option to
renew contained in the same lease. 2 The record showed that the lesseeplaintiff gave timely notice in writing to the lessor-defendant of its
election to exercise the option to renew. During the renewal term the
27
28

See note 13, ante.
Holt, "The Bones of Haddock v. Haddock," 41 Mich. L. Rev. 1013 at 1036

(1943).
1403 Ill. 390, 86 N. E. (2d) 214 (1949), affirming 335 11. App. 423, 82 N. E.
(2d) 173 (1948).
2 The pertinent provisions of the lease were: "To have and to hold . . . with
mutual option to renew for an additional term of two years under the same terms
and conditions." A separate clause stated: "An option is hereby given to the
lessee to purchase the said premises for the sum of twenty-four thousand ($24,000.00) dollars at any time during the term of this lease, free and clear of all
encumbrances."
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plaintiff, learning that the defendant was about to sell the property to
a third person, notified the defendant that it had an option to purchase
which would not expire until the end of the renewal term and that, if
defendant sold, he would be depriving plaintiff of its right to purchase
under the option. Plaintiff then filed a complaint in two counts, one for
a declaratory judgment as to its rights, the other for an injunction. The
proceedings were afterwards limited to count one upon which the trial
court declared that the option to purchase had been renewed and continued
when the plaintiff properly exercised its election to renew the tenancy.
The Appellate Court for the First District affirmed that declaratory
judgment and, on further appeal, the Supreme Court likewise affirmed.
It reasoned that the language used in the lease was expressive of an
intention by the parties that the exercise of the option to renew the lease
"under the same terms and conditions" should also serve to carry the
option to purchase over into the renewal term as an integral part of an
indivisible contract.3 Such being the case, the court was then able to say
that "the option to purchase was one of the terms of the lease and the
option to renew clearly grants to the lessee the power to renew the entire
contract upon the same terms as granted in the original undertaking. "4
Whether an option to purchase can be exercised during a renewal
term must, of course, depend upon the intention of the parties, which
intention must be gathered from the lease itself. 5 Where, however, the
parties to the lease have not stipulated in precise terms on the point,
courts are forced to formulate a rule of construction from which to achieve
a decision. In arriving at such a rule, the first point to be considered is
how the court is to regard the option to purchase in its relationship to
the entire lease, that is whether to consider the option as an integral
part of the lease or as an independent and collateral provision. The
second consideration involves a determination as to whether the renewal
term is to be considered part of one over-all leasing' or is to be treated
as a new lease.'
3 That an option is an integral part of an indivisible contract, see Garlick v.
Imgruet, 340 Ill. 136, 172 N. E. 164 (1930).
4403 Ill. 390 at 395, 86 N. E. (2d) 214 at 216.
5 Thompson v. Coe, 96 Conn. 642, 115 A. 219 (1921); Volunteers of America v.
Spring, 27 Ohio App. 22-9, 161 N. E. 215 (1927).
See also 51 C. J. S., Landlord
and Tenant, § 84.
6 Underhill, Landlord and Tenant (T. H. Flood & Co., Chicago, 1909), Vol. 2,

§ 803.
7 The court involved in Ardito v. Howell, Del. - at -, 51 A. (2d) 859 at 861
(1947), however, felt that "it would be profitless and unrealistic to resolve this
case by ascertaining whether the lease was 'extended' or 'renewed' or whether
the option to purchase is part of a 'divisible' contract or is an 'independent' agreement." It believed that the "preferable practice would seem to be merely to consider the agreement as posing a problem of construction to ascertain intent to be
resolved in the light of principles applicable to such a problem."

DISCUSSION OF RBENT DECISIONS

On the first of these points, a clear distinction appears to exist in
the American decisions as to whether an option to purchase is an integral
part of the contract or not. One view, treating the lease as being no
different than any other contract, would give no greater significance to
any one clause than to another or, to put the matter in converse fashion,
would treat all clauses as possessing equal significance. Illustrating that
view is the Maryland case of Schaeffer v. Bilger where the court treated
the clauses giving the right to obtain a renewal and also to acquire the
title as being indivisible parts of the one contract.' It came to that
conclusion through the aid of an earlier case, that of Thomas v. G. B. S.
Brewing Company,0 which had treated the option feature as a "continual
obligation" running with the lease much as would be the case of a covenant
running with the land." Something of the sort is indicated by the instant
case, for the court stressed the fact that the renewal was to be under
"the same terms and conditions" as appeared in the original lease,
considering that statement as evidence of an intention that all terms, and
not just some of them, should be renewed. It may be said that this view
reflects the majority opinion on the subject but it is not without a
respectable opposition.
The contrary view, one which treats the option to purchase as being
an incidental and collateral term of a demise of land, is best illustrated
by the Pennsylvania case of Pettit v. Tourison,'2 a case involving parallel
facts to the instant case but one which reached an opposite result. That
view is based on the concept that a lease is not, per se, a contract but is
primarily a grant of an interest in land so that all things not essential
to such grant are necessarily incidental thereto. As the court there
stated, a privilege to renew and an option to purchase "confer separate
rights and powers upon the lessee. The first has reference to the continuance of the tenancy; the latter confers upon the lessee the power to
terminate the tenancy and to become the absolute owner of the property.
The option to purchase is not an essential covenant of the lease, nor is
it a term and condition of the demise. There are many covenants which
are often found in leases which are independent and not essential parts
of the demise which without express agreement to that effect are not to
be incorporated in renewals thereof, such as a covenant to renew or any
covenant that has been fulfilled and is not continuous."13
8186 Md. 1, 45 A. (2d) 775 (1946).
9 See also Moore v. Maes, - S. C. -, 52 S. E. (2d) 204 (1949).
10 102 Md. 417, 62 A. 633 (1905).
11 See Starr v. Holck, 318 Mich. 452, 28 N. W. (2d) 289 (1947), a case which
adopts similar language.
12 283 Pa. 529, 129 A. 587, 39 A. L. R. 1106 (1925).
13 283 Pa. 529 at 531, 129 A. 587 at 587-8.
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The adherence there shown to the English views on the subject 4
have not gone without notice in other parts of the country," but it is
clear that even an incidental provision may be carried over into the
renewal period if suitable language is used to designate that intention.
Such being the case, is there not a more practical basis for the general
view since leases today have lost many of the common law characteristics
and have become more nearly simple contracts? The court in the instant
case did not say that an option to purchase could not be in the form of
an independent condition, but rather that if such was the intention it
would have to be clearly so worded.
Under the second point, which requires consideration of whether the
transaction is to be taken to consist of parts of an over-all leasing or
whether the renewal term is to be regarded as a new leasing arrangement,
a similar split of authority may be noted. If the transaction is to be given
over-all effect, any provision in the original agreement will necessarily
have to be carried forward into the renewal period unless that action is
specifically forbidden. Attempts to discriminate between the "renewal
of a lease" and the "extension of a term" have been rejected as a play
on words in the absence of clear evidence that execution of a new lease
for the additional period is required. The terms "renew" and "renewal"
not being words of art possessing some special legal or technical signification, "6' the general attitude has been to carry all covenants and conditions
of the original lease forward to the extended period, if the option to
extend is exercised.' 7 Here, again, there is evidence that a lease is to
be treated as if it were no different than any other contract.
The contrasting view may be illustrated by the Pennsylvania case
of Pettit v. Tourison,'8 referred to above. The court there held that a
provision for renewal could have reference only to the parts of the
document which constituted the terms of the demise, terms that would,
in case the option to renew was exercised, necessarily have to be carried
forward into the continued tenancy. As the option to purchase the
14 See, for example, the words of Warrington, L. J., in Sherwood v. Tucker,
[1924] 2 Ch. 440 at 446. He stated: "It has frequently been held and may be
treated as perfectly well settled that an option of purchase is not to be regarded
as a provision incident to the relation of landlord and tenant, but is a matter
collateral to and independent of it." The case is noted in 23 Mich. L. Rev. 75.
15 Carter v. Frakes, 303 Ky. 244, 197 S. W. (2d) 436 (1946); Mauzy v. Elliot,
146 Neb. 865, 22 N. W. (2d) 142 (1946). Other Pennsylvania cases in point are
Parker v. Lewis, 267 Pa. 382, 110 A. 79 (1920), and Signor v. Keystone Consistory,
227 Pa. 504, 121 A. 320 (1923).
16 Flanagan v. Hambleton, 54 Md. 222 (1880).
17 McKown v. Heery, 200 Ga. 819, 38 S. E. (2d) 204 (1946) ; Meadow Heights
Country Club v. Hinchley, 229 Mich. 291, 201 N. W. 190 (1924) ; Johnson v. Bates,
128 N. J. Eq. 183, 15 A. (2d) 642 (1940) ; Harvey Holding Co. v. Satter, 297 N. Y.
113, 75 N. E. (2d) 619 (1947) ; Masset v. Ruh, 235 N. Y. 462, 139 N. E. 574 (1923).
18283 Pa. 529, 129 A. 587, 39 A. L. R. 1106 (1925).
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premises was not there regarded to be of that category, the court said
it had to be made to reappear as a term of the renewal lease through the
use of suitable words if it was to survive the original term.1" The view
would appear to be a logical extension of the original concept that a lease
is primarily a grant and only incidentally a contract.
As long as courts start from different points of approach when dealing
with the instant problem, there is little occasion for hope of effecting a
reconciliation between these two views. Nor is the problem made simpler
by reference to a hypothetical contractual intention which the parties
themselves probably never possessed. At best, the subject can be said to
reflect a more or less arbitrary treatment forced upon courts which are
obliged to act in situations not competently covered by the parties. The
present holding evidences a desire to side with the majority view, but
it is a rather remarkable one in the light of earlier Illinois precedents
which would indicate that an option to renew is not a present demise but
is rather a covenant to grant an additional term20 which, if exercised,
results in a new lease.2 1 When an option to purchase is limited, as the
one in the instant case was, to the "term of this lease, ''22 it is a little
illogical to treat the renewal of the tenancy as being a new leasing
arrangement yet still somehow be able to carry over into it terms which
were limited to the older one. If logic be cast aside in favor of uniformity,
the decision has that much foundation to support it.
R. B.
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ONE WHO HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH STATUTE REGULATING USE OF AN

ASSUMED NAME IS VALID AND ENFORCIBLE--The case of

Mickelson

v.

Kolb,

provides the first Illinois Appellate Court interpretation of the Illinois

statute2 so far as that statute may affect the enforcibility of a contract made by one who has failed to comply with its
terms. The plaintiff there, a duly licensed real estate broker, who had
done business as the American Business & Realty Sales, brought an action
in his own name to recover a brokerage commission allegedly earned
under a contract with the defendant. Defendant moved to strike plaintiff's
"assumed

name"

19 See also Sherwood v. Tucker, [1924] 2 Ch. 440 at 445. Pollack, M. R., there
said: "It is another matter altogether to say that the option is to continue for
an extended period unless clear words are used for that purpose."
20 Fuchs v. Peterson, 315 Ill. 370, 146 N. E. 556 (1925) ; Sutherland v. Goodnow,
174 (1853).
108 Ill. 528, 48 Am. Rep. 560 (1884t; Hunter v. Silvers, 15 Ill.
21 Vincent v. Laurent, 165 Ill. App. 397 (1911).
22 403 Ill. 390 at 391, 86 N. E. (2d) 214 at 215. Italics added.
1337 Ill. App. 493, 86 N. E. (2d) 152 (1949).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch.96, § 4 et seq.
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amended complaint and to dismiss the suit on the ground that plaintiff
had violated the statute in question by failing to register his business
name until after the action was begun. The trial court sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the action. On appeal, the Appellate Court
for the First District affirmed such holding. It regarded the prohibition
against a person doing business as a real estate broker without a license3
and the substantially similar prohibition in the statute in question as
possessing equivalent effect. Since, without a broker's license, a broker
could not recover a commission,4 the court said the same rule had to be
applied to the instant case. The fact that the statute provided a penalty
for its violation was said to make it one declaring the public policy of the
state.
The view taken by the court announces a policy which is directly
opposite to that heretofore followed in this state in the absence of a
statute. At common law, it was the general rule that a person could adopt
and use a business name other than his own and contracts entered into
under that name were valid and enforcible. 5 That attitude was so well
understood that it was possible for the court, in the Illinois case of
Graham v. Eiszner,6 to say: "It is well settled that any person may adopt
any name, style or signature over which he may transact business and
issue negotiable paper and execute contracts, wholly different from his
own name, and may sue and be sued by such name, style or signature. "7
But the common law right so enunciated has been subjected to
statutory regulation in most of the states." *Where found, these statutes
generally provide that a person9 who wishes to do business under an
3 Ibid., Ch. 114 , § 1. See also Municipal Code, Chicago, Ch. 113, § 23.
4 Douthart v. Congdon, 197 Ill. 349, 64 N. E. 348 (1902) ; In re Estate of Katz,
329 Il. App. 442, 69 N. E. (2d) 25 (1946) ; Hendricks v. Richardson, 233 Ill. App.
130 (1924).
5 Beilin v. Krenn & Dato, Inc., 350 Ill. 284, 183 N. E. 330 (1932); The Union
Brewing Co. v. The Interstate Bank & Trust Co., 240 Ill. 454, 88 N. E. 997 (1909).
6 28 Ill. App. 269 (1888).
728 Ill. App. 269 at 273.
s No general provisions were to be found upon search of the statutes of Delaware,
Florida, Kansas, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Statutes from other states
are referred to in notes 12 to 19, post.
9 It is not deemed profitable to set out the application of the various statutes
to different types of business units. The statutes usually designate whether they
are to be applied to individuals, corporations, partnerships, or to the use of "&
Company" following the names of individuals where that expression does not
stand for actual partnerships. Section 7 of the Illinois act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947,
Ch. 96, § 7, excludes domestic and foreign corporations, partnerships where the
names of the partners are disclosed in the business name, and trusts.
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assumed or fictitious business name'" must register such name by filing
a certificate or affidavit with some appropriate public official," and may
even require the publication of a notice of intent to use such business
name. 12 Most states either expressly or impliedly require that such registration be a condition precedent to doing business under the name,' 8 or
declare that "it shall be unlawful" to transact business in violation of
the statute. 4 Provisions are also made for the time of filing the certificate,
the clerk's duty to keep an index of the names, the cancellation of the
registration, and fees for the clerk's services.
The principal significant differences in these statutes are to be found
in the penalty provisions. Upon examination, they will be found to fall
into three groups. The first group' 5 declares a violation of the statute to
be a misdemeanor, usually with some provision for a fine or for the
imprisonment of the violator.'
The second group directs that persons
doing business contrary to the provisions of the act shall not be permitted
to maintain any action upon any contract made under an assumed name
10 For information concerning the types of names which have been classified as
being fictitious or assumed, see annotation to Kusnetzky v. Security Insurance Company, 313 Mo. 143, 281 S.W. 47 (1926), in 45 A. L. R. 189 at 258, and to Hayes v.
Providence Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 218 Ky. 128, 290 S. W. 1028 (1927), in 59
A. L. R. 450 at 459. See also 38 Am. Jur., Name, § 24, and 45 C. J., Names, § 13.
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 96, § 4, is typical. It provides that: "No person or
persons shall hereafter conduct or transact business in this State under an assumed
name . . . unless such person or persons shall file in the office of the County
Clerk of the County In which such person or persons conduct or intend to conduct
. . .business, a certificate setting forth the name under which the said business
is, or is to be, conducted or transacted, and the true or real full name or names
of the person or persons owning, conducting or transacting the same, with the
post office address or addresses of said person or persons."
12 Publication is required by Deering Cal. Civ. Code 1941, § 4468; Ga. Code 1933,
Tit. 106, § 303, as amended by Ga. Laws 1937, p. 805; Mont. Rev. Code 1935, Ch.
158, § 8020; N. D. Rev. Code 1943, § 45-0229; Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 54, § 83; Purdon's
Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 54, § 28.4 et seq.
13 An exception thereto is to be found in Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 12, § 230, which
calls for registration of the name within ten days after written demand therefor
has been made by any creditor. Until then, the common law rule is in full effect:
Jordan Undertaking Co. v. Asberry, 230 Ala. 97, 159 So. 681 (1935).
14 See particularly Iowa Code 1946, Ch. 547.4; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann., Art. 3,
§ 15469; S. D. Code 1939, Ch. 49, §§.49.0802 and 49.9901.
15 Illinois is included therein. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 96, § 8, declares failure to
comply shall be a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment for each day
the violation continues.
16 Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 14, § 230; Ark. Stat. 1947, Tit. 70, § 405; Conn. Gen. Stat.
1949, Vol. 3, § 6728; Ga. Code 1933, Tit. 106, § 303, as amended by Ga. Laws 1937,
p. 805; Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. 1933, § 50-203; Iowa Code 1946, Ch. 547.4; Ky. Rev.
Stat. 1948, § 365.990; Dart La. Gen. Stat. 1939, § 6507; Me. Rev. Stat. 1944, Ch.
167, § 8; Mass. Ann. Laws, Ch. 110, § 5; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann., Art. 3, § 15469; N. C.
Gen. Stat. 1943, Ch. 59, § 88; N. J. Stat. Ann., Tit. 56:1-4; McKinney Cons. Laws
N. Y. Ann., Penal Law, §§ 440(6) and 440-b(5) ; R. I. Gen. Laws 1938, Ch. 386,
§ 4; Vernon's Tex. Penal Code Ann., Ch. 7, Art. 1070; Utah Code Ann. 1943, Tit.
58, Ch. 2; W. Va. Code Ann. 1943, § 4658.
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until the certificate is filed. 17 The third combines the provisions of the
other two. 18 In three states there is a further provision to the effect that
failure to file the required certificate shall be deemed prima facie evidence
of fraud in the securing of credit. 19
Courts bound by statutes falling within the first group, as was true
of the one in the instant case, were soon faced with a question as to
whether or not the penalty provided by the statute was, of itself, sufficient
to accomplish the legislative design or whether the additional penalty of
the loss of right to enforce any contract made in violation of the statute
was to be implied.20 These courts approached the problem as being
primarily one of statutory interpretation calling for an ascertainment

of legislative intent, to be gathered from the language of the statute as
read in the light of the circumstances with which it deals. 21 The first
consideration was the purpose of the statute. On this point, the courts
generally agreed that the statutory object was to protect the public by
giving information concerning the persons with whom they might deal

as well as to afford protection against fraud and deceit in obtaining
credit.2 2 But this agreement did not extend to the question of whether
this purpose required a strict enforcement of the statute.

Here two

conflicting views grew up, one allowing the violator the right to enforce
his contract, the other denying that right.
New York was among the states which, at an early time, adopted the
principle of recovery despite the violation. In the case of Wood v. Erie
Railway Company,2a the court declared that a wrongdoer was not to be
protected in the invasion of the rights of another merely because that
other happened to be transacting business in violation of a special statute.
17 Ariz. Code 1939 § 5-202; Deering Civ. Code Cal. 1941, § 4468; Mont. Rev.
Code Ann. 1935, Ch. 158, § 8020; N. D. Rev. Code 1943, Tit. 45-0229; Page's Ohio
Gen. Code, § 8104; Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 54, § 83; Remington's Wash. Rev. Stat.
Ann., Ch. 2, § 9980.
:1 Colo. Stat. Ann. 1935, Ch. 165, § 22; Ida. Code 1948, Tit. 53-506-7; Mich. Stat.
Ann., § 19.827; Minn. Stat. Ann., § 333.13; Nev. Comp. Laws 1929, §§ 4456-7; Ore.
Comp. Laws Ann., Ch. 5, §§ 43-506-7; Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 54, §§ 28.4 and
28.12; S. D. Code 1939, Ch. 49, §§ 49.0802 and 49.9901; Vt. Stat. 1947, Ch. 270,
§§6114-9; Va. Code 1942, Ch. 185, §4722(3). The Vermont statute, §6111, also

provides that persons doing business contrary to the act may be enjoined therefrom
by a court of chancery.
19 Ida. Code 1948, Tit. 53-506; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann., Ch. 5, § 43-506; Remington's
Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann., Ch. 2, § 9980.
20 Court have generally agreed that the innocent party may enforce the contract
against the person who has failed to comply with the statute; Kozy Theater Co.
v. Love, 191 Ky. 595, 231 S. W. 249 (1921), and Springer v. Fuller, 196 Mich.
628, 162 N. W. 973 (1917). Validity and enforcibility, as used here, refers only
to the violator's right.
21 See Sagal v. Fylar, 89 Conn. 293 at 298, 93 A. 1027 at 1028 (1915).
22 In
general, see annotation in 45 A. L. R. 203, and 38 Am. Jur., Name, § 14.
23 72 N. Y. (27 Sickels) 196 (1878).
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The case of Gay v. Siebold 24 held that an obligor could not plead the
statute as a defense to an action on a bond brought by the violator of
the statute, the court there saying that: "No one was deceived, and
there was no possibility that any of the parties to the bond could be
imposed on or harmed by the false designation. To indict and punish
the plaintiffs for a crime in such a case would be most absurd and would
shock the common sense, and the sense of justice of every right thinking
person. "25 Connecticut agreed with this policy, saying that the purpose
of the statute "obviously was not to provide a means by which persons
having received a benefit from another should be enabled to. retain it without compensation and to repudiate any agreement for compensation." 2 6
Other courts also believed that the defendant should not be allowed to use
the statute as a means of escaping payment. 27
Taking the lead in the view that such contracts are unlawful and
unenforcible was the Michigan case of Cashin v. Pliter.28 That was an
action brought by a construction company to collect the balance due on
a contract under which it had built a house for defendant. Verdict in the
trial court was directed for the defendant, on the ground that the contract
was void because of the statutory violation, and on appeal that ruling
was affirmed. The court there said that the "general rule is well settled
that, where statutes enacted to protect the public against fraud or
imposition, or to safeguard the public health or morals, contain a prohibition and impose a penalty, all contracts in violation thereof are
void. "29 The Virginia case of Colbert v. Ashland Construction Company, °
also a case in which the violator attempted to recover an unpaid balance
on a construction contract, led to a denial of recovery because it was felt
that courts were "established to afford remedies to litigants who seek
relief growing out of lawful transactions, and not to aid those who would
31
invoke their assistance to enforce contracts made in violation of law. "
The rule of the Cashin case has been adopted by other courts which
likewise believed that the violator should be deprived of his remedy, 32 but
N. Y. (52 Sickels) 472 (1884).
25 97 N. Y. (52 Sickels) 472 at 477.
26 Sagal v. Fylar, 89 Conn. 293 at 298, 93 A. 1027 at 1028 (1915).
27 Wolf v. Youbert, 45 La. App. 1100, 13 So. 806 (1893) ; Lipman v. Thomas,Me.-, 61 A. (2d) 130 (1948); Huey v. Passarelli, 267 Mass. 578, 166 N. E. 727
(1929); Viracola v. Comm'rs of City of Long Branch, I N. J. Misc. 200, 142
A. 252 (1923).
28168 Mich. 386, 134 N. W. 482 (1912).
29 168 Mich. 386 at 389, 134 N. W. 482 at 483.
30 176 Va. 500, 11 S. E. (2d) 612 (1940).
31176 Va. 500 at 509, 11 S. E. (2d) 612 at 616.
32 The following cases have particularly cited the rule of the Cashin case with
approval: Hunter v. Big Four Auto Co., 162 Ky. 778, 173 S. W. 120 (1915);
Courtney v. Packer, 173 N. C. 479, 92 S. E. 324 (1917) ; Beamish v. Noon, 76
Ore. 415, 149 P. 522 (1915) ; Bristol v. Noble Oil & Gas Co., 273 S. W. 946 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1925).
2497
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some courts have taken a far-sighted view and have chosen to distinguish
between the types of statutory violation to which such general rules should
be applied. In this category is the case of Kusnetzky v. Security Insurance
3
Company"
wherein the court pointed out that the general rule referred
to in the Cashin case, one which denied recovery on contracts made in
violation of statute, had been adopted in cases where the contract called
for the performance of an unlawful act, such as gambling, the sale of
lottery tickets, the illegal leasing of premises for use as a bawdy house
and the like, and should not be made to apply to the moral and harmless
act of transacting an otherwise lawful business under an assumed name.
The court there said that, if the defendant's contentions were correct,
then one "could buy on credit a car from the Capital Motor Company;
he could get his gasoline and have his car repaired at the Efficiency
Garage; he could get his groceries at Delmonico, his ice cream at the
Purity Ice Cream Company, his clothing at the Golden Eagle Clothiers,
his milk from the Model Dairy, his bread at the Home Bakery; and, after
having worn out and eaten all the stuff thus acquired without paying
for it, he could defeat all suits brought to recover pay because those
names had never been registered. And a person who would engage in
that enterprise would be, by defendant's code, a righteous citizen, en'
forcing the law because he was guilty of the most nefarious frauds ! 34
The same statement might well be made concerning the defendant in the
instant case if, in fact, the plaintiff had rendered the alleged service and
defendant's refusal to pay rested on no other ground than the statutory
violation.
When the harshness of decisions like those in the Cashin and Colbert
cases was felt in states following the no-recovery rule, there was a demand
for the development of a more equitable policy. Courts began to feel that
the statute "was not intended to produce a confiscation of property, nor
to relieve debtors from their honest obligations. "35 They began to
distinguish the former rule, as has been done in the Kusnetzky case, by
saying that it applied to acts which were malum in se and not malu~m
prohibitum, hence would not apply it where the contract was not immoral
or otherwise illegal. 6 To state the point differently, they felt that there
was nothing inherently vicious about the act of doing business under an
The defendant insurance companies
33313 Mo. 143, 281 S. W. 47 (1926).
there attempted to avoid payment to plaintiff under certain fire insurance policies
because plaintiff had entered into the policies in an unregistered name. Recovery
was permitted.
34313 Mo. 143 at 155, 281 S. W. 47 at 50.
35Engle v. Capital Fire Ins. Co. of Concord, 75 Pa. Super. 390 at 397 (1921).
36 Humphry v. City National Bank of Evansville, 190 Ind. 293, 130 N. E. 273
(1921).
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assumed name37 and would not blindly follow the earlier holdings. The
cases which had been cited to support the rule were those involving persons
who were required to procure a license before engaging in business, such
as doctors, real estate brokers, and druggists. These cases were distinguished by pointing out that the statutory regulations there concerned
served a purpose, that of insuring that only competent persons would
so practice, a purpose which was entirely different from the one involved
in statutes requiring the registration of an assumed name. These latter
statutes did not attempt to prevent the transaction of business but merely
required the performance of a statutory duty entirely collateral to the
business transaction 38 so that, if this duty was neglected, the statute
should be strictly construed and only the penalty provided therein be
invoked. With the growth of this more equitable view, a number of the
states in the first group, by reversal or amendment, aligned themselves
with the majority view permitting recovery.
An outstanding example of that reversal can be seen in Kentucky.
The court concerned in Hunter v. Big Four Auto Company9 had followed
the doctrine of the Cashin case, saying that while the act did not, in
express terms, declare that it should be unlawful to transact business in
violation of the statute, yet it was manifest that it was so intended. It
was given an opportunity to examine into the wisdom of the Hunter
case through the later case of Hayes v. Providence Citizens' Bank & Trust
Company.4 0 The plaintiff there brought an action against defendant bank
to recover money he had deposited with it. Among other defenses, the
defendant pleaded that the plaintiff, at the time covered in the complaint,
had been doing business under the name of the "Dreamland Theatre"
but had not registered that name. The trial court, after all proof was in,
dismissed the jury and granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. That holding was reversed on appeal. The court first noted that,
in the Hunter case, it had said: "It is probable that a rule like this
may, in some instances, work a hardship by permitting one person to get
the benefit of another person's labor, services or property without compensation. ' 4 1 It now declared that experience had "demonstrated that
this is about all the rule has done." Re-examining the question, the court
expressed the belief that the object of the statute was "certainly not
37 Hayes v. Providence Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 218 Ky. 128, 290 S. W. 1028
(1927).
8 Uhlman v. Kin Daw, 97 Ore. 681, 193 P. 435 (1920).
In Sutton & Company v.
Coast Trading Co., 49 Wash. 694, 96 P. 428 (1908), the court expressed the belief that any other result would militate against the common law privilege to

contract.
39 162 Ky. 778, 173 S. W. 120 (1915).
40 218 Ky. 128, 290 S. W. 1028 (1927).
41 162 Ky. 778 at 783, 173 S. W. 120 at 122.
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accomplished or even furthered by adding to the penalty expressedly
imposed the additional one of the loss of goods, chattels, or services sold
or performed by one doing business in violation of the statute. Such a
cumulative penal result is scarcely commensurate with the evil sought to
be remedied. "42 It accordingly repudiated the Hunter case and all
Kentucky cases following it, saying that the reversal brought the state
from an isolated position to one of accord with the overwhelming weight
44
of authority. 43 Similar reversals have occurred in other states.
Not all states have been so fortunate in the effort to obtain judicial
re-appraisal of the subject. In Georgia, for example, the statute had
provided that "it shall be unlawful" for any person to transact business
under an unregistered assumed name and declared such violation to be
a misdemeanor. 45 Both the trial and the intermediate reviewing courts,
in Dunn & McCarthy, Incorporated v. Pinkston,41 had been of the opinion
that plaintiff's violation of the act did not prevent him from instituting
and maintaining a suit. The Supreme Court reversed,4 7 citing the case
of a physician who had failed to register in compliance with another state
statute and the case of a broker who had failed to obtain a license. The
Georgia legislature, however, amended the statute in 1937 so as to provide
that the violator should be guilty of a misdemeanor but should "suffer
no other further penalty or forfeiture on account of any such failure to
register, except costs as hereinafter provided."48 By reason thereof, the
42218 Ky. 128 at 133, 290 S. W. 1028 at 1030.
43 The doctrine of the Hayes case has since been applied in Bentley v. Regal
Block Coal Co., 218 Ky. 258, 291 S. W. 28 (1927), and in Mammoth Garage v.
Taylor, 220 Ky. 499, 295 S. W. 429 (1927).
44The Indiana case of Horning v. McGill, 188 Ind. 332, 116 N. E. 303 (1917),
had held that violation of the statute rendered the contract void but, in Humphry
v. City National Bank of Evansville, 190 Ind. 293, 130 N. E. 273 (1921), the
court took the position that the statute did not void the contract but merely
provided an opportunity to set the matter up in abatement until compliance
occurred. The case of Ayres v. McNeely, 75 Ind. App. 327, 130 N. E. 539 (1921),
states that the Horning case was overruled by the Humphry case. Oregon, in
1915, had followed the lead of the Cashin case when it decided the appeal in
Beamish v. Noon, 76 Ore. 415, 149 P. 522 (1915).
In 1920, however, the court
reviewed the subject, in Uhlman v. Kin Daw, 97 Ore. 681, 193 P. 435 (1920), and
there held that the contract was not void but that action could not be maintained
until the certificate was filed. The Texas case of Loving v. Place, 266 S. W.
231 (Tex. Civ. App., 1924), had followed the Hunter case and the views there
expressed had been applied in Bristol v. Noble Oil & Gas Co., 273 S. W. 946 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1925). But the highest Texas court, in Paragon Oil Syndicate v. Rhoades
Drilling Co., 115 Tex. 149, 277 S. W. 1036 (1925), ruled that the violation of the
statute did not render the contract unenforcible unless some injury could be
shown from the failure to comply. See also Whitton Oil & Gas Co. v. Trapshooter Development Co., 291 S. W. 267 (Tex. Civ. App., 1927).
45 Ga. Code 1933, Tit. 106, §§ 301 and 303.
4647 Ga. App. 514, 170 S. E. 922 (1933).
47179 Ga. 31, 175 S. E. 4 (1934).
48 Ga. Laws 1937, p. 805, Section 303 of Ga. Code 1933, as so amended, now
reads: "The effect hereof shall be that no contract or undertaking entered into
by any person, firm or corporation, whether heretofore or hereafter entered into,
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case of Bullard v. Hotman 9 points out that all former decisions are now
ineffective. It is also worthy of note that Michigan, which had sired the
doctrine of the Cashin case, later amended the act there interpreted so
as to declare that the fact that a penalty had been provided was not to
be construed to avoid a contract but that the violator should be prohibited
from bringing any suit until after full compliance.50 Other states have
followed suit. 1 It may be said, then, that the majority view presently
held in states still within the first category, whether because of judicial
decision or legislative action, now permits suit on the contracts or transactions of the statutory violator, albeit he still remains liable to punishment for his violation.
As would be expected, courts in states falling in the second group all2
5
agree that non-compliance with the statute is mere matter of abatement
requiring no more than suspension of the trial until the statute has been
complied with,53 so that the right of action is not destroyed but only the
shall be invalidated or declared illegal on the ground that the same was entered
into in a trade or partnership name not filed or registered in accordance with
the laws in force at the time such contract was entered into; but all such contracts are expressly validated as against any such objection; and no suit or action
heretofore or hereafter instituted by any such person, firm, partnership or corporation, whether sounding in contract or tort, shall be defeated because of any
such failure to register. But the party who has failed to register his trade or
partnership name at the time the suit is filed, as required by this Act, shall be
cast with court costs."
49 184 Ga. 788, 193 S. E. 586 (1937).
50 Mich. Stat. Ann., § 19.827, as amended by Pub. Acts 1919, No. 263.
51 The North Carolina case of Courtney v. Packer, 173 N. C. 479, 92 S. E. 324
(1917), following the Cashin case, had denied recovery. The statute was amended
in 1919 so that the violator could bring action: N. C. Gen. Stat. 1943, Ch. 59, § 88.
Recovery has since been allowed in Farmers' Bank & Trust Co. v. Murphy, 189
N. C. 479, 127 S. E. 527 (1925). A discord which had existed in the lower courts
of Pennsylvania was resolved in Lamb v. Condon, 276 Pa. 544, 120 A. 546 (1923),
favoring recovery although admitting that violators were subject to the penalty.
Because of that discord, the legislature amended the act several times in an effort
to clearly establish the legislative purpose. In 1945, a new statute was substituted providing that failure to comply shall not impair the validity of any contract but, before action is instituted, the violator must comply and pay a fine:
Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 54, §§ 28.4 and 28.12. As late as 1940, the Virginia
court, in Colbert v. Ashland Construction Co., Inc., 176 Va. 500 at 509, 11 S. E.
(2d) 612 at 616 (1940), after a long review of cases, said there could be no
recovery, pointing out that it would be "strange, indeed, were the commonwealth
to say to a litigant, 'You have a valid contract and the entire machinery of the
state may be invoked in its enforcement, but of course you must go to jail!'" The
legislature, that year, amended the act so that the violator could maintain his
action after complying therewith, but it still declares his conduct to be a misdemeanor punishable by a fine up to $1,000 and imprisonment up to one year. The
"strange" result can apparently still happen in that state. The case of Phlegar v.
Virginia Foods, Inc., 188 Va. 747, 51 S. E. (2d) 227 (1949), now indicates that
the amendment removes the taint of illegality after compliance has occurred.
52 See, for example, Wallace Plumbing Co. v. Dillon, 71 Colo. 224, 205 P. 950
(1922).
53 Kadota Fig Ass'n v. Case-Swayne Co., 73 Cal. App. (2d) 796, 167 P. (2d) 518
(1946).
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remedy is, temporarily, affected. 54 A violator in these jurisdictions may
acquire the unquestioned right and capacity to maintain the action by
filing the certificate, either before or after the occurrence of the transaction or the making of the contract, or after the commencement of the
action. 5 Courts of states in the third group have generally held that
non-compliance does not void the contract" but only defers action until
the certificate is filed,57 leaving the person liable to the statutory penalty.58
On the score of the general problem, a North Carolina court once
said: "It seems impossible to suppose for a moment that the legislature,
sagacious as it is and endowed, in the highest degree, with practical
wisdom and practical common sense, would enact a statute, which would
do so much evil and so little good, as to a clearly innocent and harmless
undertaking. "59 It seems equally unfortunate that the General Assembly
of Illinois should have kept its sagacity so well hidden by writing into
the law of this state an act which, having been the basis of so much controversy in other states, did not clearly express the effect it was intended
to have on the validity of contracts made in violation thereof. Practically
every case or amendment cited herein had occurred before the Illinois
act was approved and was available for study. The unfortunate having
happened, it can only be said that the situation has not been aided by
the decision in the instant case or by the action of the court in choosing
to follow a rule rejected elsewhere from experience. That decision puts
this state in the secluded position of holding to a rule which has shown
itself to be only a source of injustice and hardship.
Perhaps the General Assembly, now that its handiwork has been
evaluated, will give the problem the serious consideration it should have
received in 1941. If that body needs some parallel, it might consider what
it had to say regarding transactions entered into by foreign corporations
doing business within the state without first obtaining a certificate of
authority.60 If the unauthorized contracts of such concerns are to be
enforced, there is little justification for denying the same privilege to
local inhabitants who have done harmless, perhaps beneficial, acts under
an assumed name without first attending to its registration.

J. F.

WHITFIELD

54 Canonica v. St. George, 64 Mont. 200, 208 P. 607 (1922).
55 Peterson v. Morris, 119 Wash. 335, 205 P. 408 (1922).
56 Gallafant v. Tucker, 48 Ida. 240, 281 P. 375 (1929) ; Bovee v. DeJong, 22 S. D.
163, 116 N. W. 83 (1908).
57 Uhlman v. Kin Daw, 97 Ore. 681, 193 P. 435 (1920); Phlegar v. Virginia
Foods, Inc., 188 Va. 747, 51 S. E. (2d) 227 (1949).
58 Lamb v. Condon, 276 Pa. 544, 120 A. 546 (1923).
59 Price v. Edwards, 178 N. C. 493 at 497, 101 S. E. 33 at 35 (1919).
60 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32, § 157.125.

RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS.
DIVORCE-JURISDICTION,
NEY FOR PETITIONER

MAY

PROCEEDINGS AND
RE-OPEN

DIVORCE

RELIEF-WHETHER ATTORPROCEEDING,

DISMISSED

STIPULATION OF PARTIES, TO ENFORCE PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S

ON

FEE--A

point of some concern to practicing lawyers has been made in the recent
case of Hefner v. Hefner.' Petitioner had there acted on behalf of the
plaintiff in the preparation and filing of a suit for divorce. He was,
during the pendency of the proceeding, notified by his client that his
retainer was terminated but no substitution of attorneys was made. Not
long thereafter, the case was dismissed on a stipulation signed by the
plaintiff and the defendant, as well as by defendant's attorney. More
than thirty days after dismissal had occurred, petitioner took steps to
have the order of dismissal vacated and sought an order fixing the amount
of his fees. The trial court reinstated the case, determined the value of
petitioner's services and ordered payment of such fee by both plaintiff and
defendant. On appeal from that order, the Appellate Court for the First
District reversed because (1) there was no basis, under the Divorce Act,
for the court to make an award in favor of the attorney against his own
former client, 2 and (2) because it was the firm public policy of the state,
in the interest of the preservation of marriages, to put no stumbling blocks
in the path of a possible reconciliation.3 The attorney was, therefore,
remitted to any separate action he might have against either his client
or the defendant, or both. The case invokes interest for the reason that
the statute, although it now gives to the attorney a personal right to
enforce payment of an award made for attorney's fees, 4 still apparently

fails to insure him of protection, other than by a suit on the contract of
employment,5 in the event the plaintiff should insist on the right to dismiss
the action.6
1 Sub nom. Petition of Runke, 338 Ill. App. 179, 80 N. E. (2d) 885 (1949).
2 The court noted that Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Ch. 40, § 16, which is the source
of the court's authority to fix fees in divorce cases, limits that authority to the
making of an award to be paid by the opposite party.
3 Watson v. Watson, 335 Ill. App. 637, 82 N. E. (2d) 671 (1948).
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 40, § 16, as amended by Laws 1947, p. 818, S. B. No.
417, permits the court to make the award direct to the attorney and to grant
execution thereon. As to the former practice, see Anderson v. Steger, 173 Ill. 112,
50 N. E. 665 (1898).
5 Recovery against the husband under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 68, § 15, on the
theory of a family expense, would seem unavailable because the parties were
not living together at the time the service was rendered: Featherstone v. Chapin,
93 Ill. App. 223 (1901).
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 176, regulating the voluntary dismissal of a suit,
would not seem to prevent such action for, if reconciliation has occurred, the
defendant would undoubtedly consent thereto despite any cross-complaint which
may have been filed.
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FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES--TRANSFERS AND TRANSACTIONS INVALIDWHETHER OR NOT SALE OF MINOR PORTION OF STOCK AND EQUIPMENT TO
ONE AND SIMULTANEOUS SALE OF BALANCE THEREOF TO ANOTHER REQUIRES

OF BULK SALES AcT-An interesting conflict arose in
Corrigan v. Miller,' between a judgment creditor of the vendor and a
vendee who had purchased a minor portion of a stock of goods, not in
the ordinary course of trade, without formally complying with the provisions of the Bulk Sales Act. 2 It appeared that the vendor, whose
ex-wife had obtained a judgment against him for accrued alimony, had
been operating a combined rubber tile and marble contracting business.
He sold the rubber tile stock and equipment to Corrigan for approximately
one-third of the aggregate price, paid in cash, but transferred the marble
contracting business to another for the remaining two-thirds of the total
price, payable in notes. After the ex-wife had levied on the stock and
equipment which composed Corrigan's share of the purchase, he filed a
claim for the return of the property so seized. A trial court judgment
in his favor was reversed by the Appellate Court for the Second District
when it determined that the statute applied because the two sales, having
occurred simultaneously and being within the knowledge of the two
purchasers, really amounted to a single transaction involving substantially
all of the vendor's business stock and equipment. 3
It is clear that the statute would be applicable had the two vendees
purchased jointly for the term "vendee" is, by another section of the
statute, defined to include the plural of that term so long as the several
persons are "party on any sale." 4 But such was not the situation in the
APPLICATION

instant case for each buyer purchased for himself, paying his own con-

sideration and taking his own bill of sale. It is likewise clear that the
sale to the other purchaser fell within the statute for, judging by the
disproportionate amount paid, he had purchased at least the "major part"
of the vendor's business.5 It is not clear, however, whether the result
1338 Ill. App. 212, 86 N. E. (2d) 853 (1949).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121Y, § 78. The statute purports to apply to the
sale, in bulk, of the "major part or the whole" of a stock of merchandise or other
goods and chattels. (Italics added.) It is not confined to merchandising operations and may extend to a farmer's sale of his livestock: Coon v. Doss, 361 Ill.
515, 198 N. E. 341, 102 A. L. R. 561 (1935).
3 The report of the case does not indicate that the purchasers, other than being
employees of the vendor, in any way were aware of his intention to depart from
the vicinity promptly after the sale so as to defeat the enforcement of the alimony
judgment. For that matter, no claim was advanced that the two sales were based
upon an insufficient consideration. It is difficult, therefore, to read into the case
any desire on the part of the purchasers to help out in a known fraudulent transaction.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121Y, § 80.
5 That term has been defined to mean more than one-half, for a sale of a 50%
interest in a business is not within the statute: Zenith Radio Distributing Corp. v.
Mateer, 311 Ill.
App. 263, 35 N. E. (2d) 815 (1941).
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attained as to Corrigan is to be predicated on (1) his knowledge of the
other purchase, or (2) on the fact that he bought an entire and distinct
department of the vendor's business. If the former, then the simultaneous
nature of the purchases is hardly significant except as it serves to prove
his knowledge. A purchase of a minor share of a business by one who
knows that his vendor intends, the next day, to sell the balance would,
according to this case, come within the comprehension of the statute and
would force such purchaser to attend to its requirements. If the latter,
it does not appear from the legislative language that a vendor is to be
regarded as having several businesses, particularly not at one location,
merely because he may have departmentalized his operations. The decision,
therefore, is one which will bear close scrutiny.
INSURANCE-CONTROL

AND

REGULATION

IN

GENERAL-WHETHER

FAILURE OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY TO OBTAIN OFFICIAL APPROVAL FOR

CONTRACT PROVISIONS, THEREBY EXPOSING IT TO A STATUTORY PENALTY,
THE UNAPPROVED PROVISIONS-Suit to recover the

SERVES TO INVALIDATE

face amount due under a life insurance contract was begun, in Dempsey

v. National Life & Accident Insurance Company,1 by the named beneficiary. The company answered by setting up a military service limitation
contained in the policy and alleged that the insured had died on Bataan
Peninsula in the early days of World War II while in the armed forces.
It offered a return of the premiums paid under the contract. Plaintiff
replied that (1) the insured had been prevented, by the emergency of
the Japanese invasion of the Philippine Islands, from complying with the
military service rider;2 (2)

that the rider was inoperative as a binding

contract provision because of ambiguity and indefiniteness; and (3) was
illegal and void because the consent of the Director of Insurance had not
been obtained to the insertion thereof in the contract.3 Decision having
passed in favor of the beneficiary for the face of the policy, the insurance
company appealed. The Appellate Court for the First District ordered
reversal when it decided, for the first time in this state, that failure to

obtain official consent to the contract provisions did not serve to invalidate the same. Its holding in that regard is probably justified by
1338 Ill. App. 109, 86 N. E. (2d) 871 (1949).

Feinberg, P. J., wrote a dissenting

opinion. He was of the opinion that the rider relied on by way of defense was
invalid for ambiguity, citing Arendt v. North American Life Ins. Co., 107 Neb.
716, 187 N. W. 65 (1922). His dissenting opinion is silent on the point here considered.
2 The court did not pass on the sufficiency of this excuse for non-compliance.
Presumably, the insured was not excused by reason of any impossibility of performance caused by war-time conditions.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 73 § 755, states that no company "shall issue or deliver .. . a policy or . . . attach an endorsement or rider thereto . . . until the form
and consent of such ... rider ...
has been filed with and approved by the Director."
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reason of the saving effect of Section 442 of the Insurance Code 4 but it
is worthy of notice, if for no other reason, because of the contrast it
provides to the holding in Mikelson v. Kolb,' pronounced in the same
district. In each case, the failure to observe statutory requirements exposed
the violator to penalties, 6 but the contract was held enforcible in the one
and not enforcible in the other. From the standpoint of the substantial
equities involved, the balance would seem to favor the converse result.
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-DIsTRICT PROPERTY, CONTRACTS AND
LIABILITIES--WHETHER HOLDER OF POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER OF LAND HELD
FOR

SCHOOL

PURPOSES

ONLY

IS

ENTITLED

TO

IMPROVEMENT

ERECTED

THEREON BY SCHOOL DISTRICT UPON CESSATION OF USE OF LAND FOR SCHOOL

PuRPosEs-The facts in Low v. Blakeney' disclosed that the ancestor of

the plaintiffs, in 1869, had conveyed an acre of Illinois land to certain
school trustees "for school purposes only" with specific stipulation for
the reverter "of the said one acre of land" in the event such use should
thereafter cease. A school house was erected on the premises and was used
for many years. In 1945, the trustees abandoned the use of the land and
took steps to sell and remove the structure so erected. 2 Plaintiffs, claiming
ownership of the land and the building, sued to enjoin the proposed sale.
The school trustees did not contest the reverter of the feel but did contend
that plaintiffs had acquired no right in the building. Upon dismissal of
plaintiffs' petition, an appeal was taken directly to the Illinois Supreme
Court.4 That court, two justices dissenting, affirmed on the ground that
(1) there was indication, from the language of the deed of an intention
to retain a possibility of reverter in the land alone because of the presence
of the words "said one acre of land," but that (2) an interpretation of
4 Ibid., Ch. 73, § 1054, does state that any rider form "issued without submitting
the same for approval ... shall nevertheless be valid."
5337 Ill. App. 493, 86 N. E. (2d) 152 (1949), noted ante under Discussion of
Recent Decisions.
6 Compare Section 446 of the Insurance Code, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 73, § 1058,
with Section 5 of the "assumed name" statute, ibid., Ch. 96, § 8.
1403 Ill. 161, 85 N. E. (2d) 741 (1949). Crampton, J., wrote a dissenting opinion
concurred in by Thompson, J.
2 The earlier case of Hackett v. School Trustees, 398 Ill. 27, 74 N. E. (2d) 869
(1947), presenting a somewhat similar situation, is distinguishable on the ground
that the grantor there concerned reserved only an option to repurchase the premises whenever the school use should terminate rather than a possibility of reverter. The recent extensive consolidation that is going on among the school
districts may be productive of even more variations of the problem, for grantors
have not been uniform in their language.
3 But note the possible application of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 30, §§ 37e-37f.
That statute provides that, after its date, no right of re-entry or possibility of
reverter shall be valid for more than fifty years, nor shall any such right more
than fifty years old be regarded as enforcible. See also Denissen, "The Illinois
Reverter Act," 36 Ill. B. J. 263-71 (1947).
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 199.
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Section 22 of Article 4 of the School Code5 revealed a legislative intent
that school buildings erected on land conveyed for school purposes only
should be and remain personalty both as to title and as to sale or other
disposition. The common law doctrine that structures affixed to the soil
are generally to be regarded as a part thereof, hence would go with the
title in case of reverter, appears to have been subjected to modification,
at least where school lands are concerned.
TAXATION-REDEMPTION

FROM TAX SALE--WHETHER

MAY REDEEM FOR LESs THAN AMOUNT

OR NOT

OWNER

Bm AT TAx SALE WHERE SALE

HAS BEEN AssIG_>---The case of Dupuy v. Morsel required
the Appellate Court for the Fourth District to give interpretation to the
redemption provisions of the so-called Scavenger Act 2 as the same applied
to a situation wherein plaintiff's land had been sold for the payment of
ten years of delinquent taxes and had been purchased, at the sale, by the
county in which the land was located. The county had thereafter sold
and assigned the certificates of purchase to the defendant for amounts
substantially less than the amount bid at the sale. Plaintiff, desiring to
redeem, asserted the right to do so at the price paid by the assignee, plus
certain other items like subsequent taxes, interest, fees and court costs.
Defendant insisted on payment of the bid price. The trial court, in a
suit to compel redemption, believing that the plaintiff, in equity, should
be entitled to redeem at the lower figure, so ordered. Its decree, on appeal,
was reversed and remanded with a direction that the trial court should
comply with the specific requirements of the redemption section of the
Revenue Act.3 As the assignment of a certificate of purchase vests in
the assignee all the rights and title of the original purchaser, it would
seem reasonable that the assignee should be able to demand all that the
assignor could have claimed. While sympathy for the taxpayer might lead
to the approval of the position taken by the lower court, it is believed
that the rule adopted accomplishes the legislative purpose of replacing
delinquent property on the tax rolls. Encouraging the purchase of tax
sale certificates by third persons, even though the discount will cause
some present loss of revenue, will insure more stable governmental income
for the future. Any other holding would have left the county government
without revenue from the property until it was able to acquire a clear
title and dispose of the fee.
CERTIFICATE

5 Ibid., Ch. 122, § 4-22.

6 Matzan v. Griffin, 78 Ill. 477 (1875).
1337 Ill. App. 1, 85 N. E. (2d) 187 (1949).
2 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 120, § 716a.
3 Ibid., Ch. 120, § 734. That statute specifies that redemption shall be for the
amount for which the land was sold together with penalties. Section 716a makes
cross reference thereto but makes some modification in the penalty provisions.
It is otherwise silent on the subject of the problem posed in the instant case.

BOOK REVIEWS.
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: The Seventh
Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture. Arthur L. Goodhart, K.C. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1949. Pp. 44.

ENGLISH

Edward H. Levi.
University of Chicago Press, 1949. Pp. 74.

AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING.

Chicago: The

These two slender publications have more in common than the mere
fact that the text of each has previously appeared in the columns of a
law journal,1 plus the further fact that each author occupies an eminent
place in the field of legal education. The first is intended to demonstrate
that the English view of a philosophy of law is essentially a pragmatic
one, tending away from a priori reasoning and abstract ideas in the air.
The other, to show the dynamic role of legal concepts in a society where
both certainty and change are essential to development but where neither
can be attained by attention simply to formalistic reasoning. They are,
then, worthy of joint consideration.
The first author attacks his assignment by expounding a text borrowed
from the writings of the man in whose honor the lecture was given.
Justice Cardozo had written that a "philosophy of law will tell us how
law comes into being, how it grows and whither it tends. "' 2 Professor
Goodhart amplifies thereon by showing, briefly yet historically, how the
great English legal writers and thinkers, from Bracton onward, strove to
establish the concept of supremacy of law while at the same time recognizing its mutable character. Growth of law, he notes, has been left, by
and large, to the hands of English judges who have supervised that growth
not always from slavish regard for precedent but often with conscious
awareness that the common law case system is not complete, hence may
well require the formulation of new precedents to fit truly novel cases.
As to the third problem, or purpose of law, he indicates that the more
modern writers, while not organized into definite philosophic schools, have
generally concentrated on the proposition that law, to be effective, must
bring about compromise between conflicting interests so as to achieve
a desirable, if not logical, uniformity. He and they agree, with Justice
Cardozo, that the "philosophy of the common law is at bottom the
philosophy of pragmatism.' '
1 The Goodhart paper may be found, less certain revisions, in 48 Col. L. Rev.

671-88 (1948).

Professor Levi's article first appeared in 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev.

501-74 (1948).

2 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law (Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn.,
1924), p. 24.
3 Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale University Press, New

Haven, Conn., 1921), p. 102.
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Professor Levi's study may be said to recognize and accept Goodhart's thought as to the pragmatic nature of Anglo-American legal
philosophy, in fact he gives reinforcement thereto at the outset by demonstrating the illogic of any other belief. Books have been written, are
undoubtedly in the course of being written, to prove that judges do not
do what they say they do. Legal reasoning is not, nor can it be, entirely
a process of strict adherence to logical forms. It is, as he suggests, more
nearly a process of reasoning by example, yet with the distinction that
similarities and differences between the example, that is the precedent case,
and the new situation are not always to be regarded as the key factors
leading to the solution. In that respect, it is uttering a truism to state4
that lawyers will acknowledge that "the law is not always logical at all."
If Professor Levi had stopped at that point, he would have done
little of real service. The balance of his study possesses far more value.
He has taken three fundamental situations of divergent legal problems
and carried them through all the stages of judicial development in order
to show how legal reasoning does, in fact, proceed. One illustration, drawn
from the realm of case law, elaborates on the "inherently dangerous" rule
of MacPherson v. Btick Motor Company.' A second, posing the problem
of judicial construction of statutory law, uses the Mann Act as a guiding
text. The third, showing how a court may expand on a constitutional
provision, traces the judicial attitude toward the commerce clause. The
treatment of all three is detailed and excellent, yet the study ends on the
note that to contrast law and logic is to do a disservice to both.
What, then, does Professor Levi seek to prove ? In his own words,
simply that legal reasoning "has a logic of its own." Briefly, it seeks to
"give meaning to ambiguity and to test constantly whether . . . society
has come to see new differences or similarities . . . [It is] the only kind

of system which will work when people do not agree completely." That
statement is reminiscent of Goodhart's closing remark to the effect that
law "must be a compromise between conflicting interests, and that the
proper interpretation of the law depends not on abstract conceptions but
on a wise judgment which does not forget that it is concerned with the
lives of ordinary men." The parallels are sufficiently obvious to warrant
the reading of both books or the consideration of neither. The person who
does the latter will have only his own ignorance to blame.
W. F.

ZACHARIAS

4 See opinion by Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A. C. 495 at 506.
5 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916).
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Donald H. Wollett. Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 1949. Pp. xxv, 148, and
appendix.

LABOR RELATIONS AND FEDERAL LAW.

An attempt is here made to chart a new course in the field of federal
policy on the subject of labor relations. Charting new courses should not
prove to be unusual to the author, he having been a naval officer during
the war and now being a professor at the University of Washington School
of Law. To the reader, however, any appreciation of the new policy which
the author visualizes must be based upon an understanding of the present
policy as manifested by the statute commonly known as the Taft-Hartley
Act. An evaluation of the terms of that statute being imperative, the
author lays down certain principles which, in his opinion, must be accepted
as basic prerequisites in any attempt to build up a constructive labor
policy.
Paramount among these principles is the recognition that "collective
bargaining is the most effective device for spanning the schism between
organized labor and management in a free economy," and "that the
administrative process is a more useful and just device for achieving
economic objectives which are in the public interest than criminal or civil
law." There can be no quarrel with these statements, especially in view
of the past history of labor relations in this country. Obviously, collective
bargaining is the only appropriate method by which free men can thresh
out their mutual problems and arrive at a satisfactory solution, blunting
the sharpness of their conflicting economic interests. It also seems proven
that the administrative process is much better suited to deal with the
problem of labor relations than time-honored and slow-moving court
procedures.
The discussion of the structure of the National Labor Relations Board
and its procedure does not overlook the tremendous power possessed by
the General Counsel of the Board. As he has been invested with the final
authority to determine what unfair labor practice charges should be
investigated and what formal complaints should issue, no review of his
determination is possible. The concentration of so much power in the
hands of one man seems unfortunate. The Board itself is supposed
to exercise jurisdiction only over industries or activities which "affect
commerce." Failure to note or emphasize the trend taken by the Board,
in an effort to extend its jurisdiction to hear and determine cases which
have only a very loose connection with interstate commerce, leads to a
belief that a more detailed discussion of these jurisdictional problems,
especially by one attempting to lay the ground-work for a future federal
labor policy, would have been desirable.
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The analysis and evaluation of the substantive provisions of the
Taft-Hartley Act is, however, extremely well done. The author here
reveals not only a thorough knowledge of the legal questions involved but
also a deep understanding of the human and economic problems which
underly the thorny issues. It would exceed the limits of a review to
discuss in detail all the questions thrown up by this book. One example
might serve as an illustration. The author, dealing with union security
measures, points to the fact that unions have sometimes used closed shop
and union shop agreements as "instruments of abuse." Barring workers
who belong to racial minority groups from admission into union membership often prevents them from earning a livelihood in a chosen occupation.
The Taft-Hartley Act does not provide an adequate solution although it
deals with some aspects of the problem. It is the author's judgment that
the federal statute is not likely to promote individual worker freedom
by insuring democratic rights to the worker within the institutional
framework of strong unions. It is more likely apt to promote individual
worker freedom by weakening the unions institutionally.
In that regard, the author believes the 1947 amendment to the
Massachusetts Labor Relations Act deals more intelligently with the
problem by forbidding the employer from discharging an employee for
non-membership in a union having a union security agreement with the
employer, unless the union certifies that the employee was deprived of
membership for a bona fide occupational disqualification or because of
proper disciplinary action. That act provides an opportunity for review
of the lawfulness of the suspension or expulsion. The book, then, in
general, furnishes an intelligent guide to the problems which face any
effort to formulate a rational federal labor policy.
F. HERZOG

Second Edition.
George W. Goble. Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company,
Inc., 1949. Pp. xiii, 944.

CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE,

When an instructor is faced with the selection of a new casebook,
being faithful to his calling, he determines to examine meticulously each
offering in the field and, with caliper and micrometer of thought, to gauge
the quality of all. Many who have done so have all too frequently concluded that, except for the color of the binding, there are but few
differences in the casebook lists of the recognized publishers. It is, therefore, a little like striking a "lost chord" when one discovers a casebook
novel in its method and presentation, albeit sound. Such a casebook is
the subject of this review.
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Two features commend it to the writer. They are: (1) the suggested
plans for the development of the subject dependant upon the time devoted
to the course in insurance with a selection of cases in each instance
indicative of much thought, and (2) the definite separation of life and
accident insurance from that of property, a division logical enough because
of the basic difference in the concept of insurable interest but one often
disregarded in the format of other casebooks. The placing of the life
and accident section immediately following the introductory material is
itself a new approach, but a good one for, as all instructors know, it is
best to begin with matters concerning which the student has the greatest
familiarity. In the field of insurance, that is generally the life policy.
If, in the reviewer's creed, there is the cardinal rule that fault must
be found with something, then it is the opinion of the writer that the
author devotes too much space to the section on life and accident insurance.
A few cases there present might well be eliminated. One is also apt to
miss, and regret the absence of such basic cases in property insurance law
as the decisions in LeCras v. Hughes1 and Lucena v. Crauford.2 These
are negligible imperfections at most for Professor Goble has produced a
casebook which undoubtedly will be well-received.
T. F. BAYER

LAW: Text, Cases and Other Materials.
Jefferson B.
Fordham. Brooklyn, New York: University Casebook Series, The
Foundation Press, Inc., 1949. Pp. xxx, 1060.

LocAL GOVERNMENT

Few subjects in the law school curriculum are better suited to the
mode of presentation followed by this author than is the course in
Municipal Corporations. It is inevitable that some departure from the
case system should be made to permit inquiry into the techniques and
materials familiar to students of political science, since the lawyer's
function in local government matters requires a knowledge of 'administrative procedures and management practices. He will not be limited to
problems that are strictly legal in nature. Recognizing the need for
orienting the student before repeatedly plunging him, without warning,
into complex phases of local government, the author has prefaced each
section with extensive textual material designed and written especially
for that purpose. This supplementary material, which constitutes roughly
a third of the book, is partly concerned with the development of the
various topics, partly explanatory of the subject matter, but at times
13 Doug. 81, 99 Eng. Rep. 549 (1782).
2 2 B. & P. N. R. 269, 127 Eng. Rep. 630 (1805).
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clearly sets forth trends and approaches which have become well established in spite of the enormous number of local units involved.
Since much of the material in a course in local government law
cannot be adequately presented through the use of isolated cases, the
supplementary material thus provided make the book a storehouse of
information not readily available for presentation in lecture form by
most teachers of the subject. The cases are, for the most part, of recent
date, historical material having been covered in the text. They are
illustrative of the judicial approach to typical, as well as to provocative,
factual situations. Statutory matter has not been neglected and many
typical constitutional provisions are reproduced. The author's consideration of the modern relation between local units and the federal government
furnishes a valuable addition.
The demand for an approach which prepares the student with
functional knowledge of local affairs in, such areas as those concerning
financial administration and personnel matters has been met. The
modification of the traditional case system is justified by the wealth of
valuable and hard-to-get information which the book contains. That fact
alone places this volume among the small group of school books which will
remain useful to the student when he becomes a lawyer.
J. R. BLOMQUIST
DELBEPmATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL

GRESSES:

PENAL

AND

Questions and Answers. Negley K.

PENITENTIARY

Teeters.

CON-

Philadelphia:

Temple University Book Store, 1949. Pp. 198.
An introduction to this book, written by the present president of
the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission, notes that the
heavy tomes of the various proceedings of the eleven international congresses which have been held since 1872 are generally inaccessible, first
because they are published in French, and second because shelved in
few American libraries. For these reasons alone, the author has performed a labor of distinction by translating and compiling at least the
questions submitted and the answers adopted by vote of these several
congresses. He has added valuable historical data concerning the personalities responsible for the conduct thereof, the places which served
as the scene of the deliberations, and other sidelights on the several
sessions. Students of penology are here provided with material which
should stimulate interest in the twelfth such congress which is to be held
at The Hague in 1950.
International reaction to proposals concerning extradition, juvenile
delinquency, the indeterminate sentence, prison labor, and the like, as
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disclosed by the pages of this book, reflects favorably on the American
efforts to advance the science of penology. Humanitarian Americans,
devoting selfless and untiring energy toward the improvement of the
lot of imprisoned persons, have led in these matters. It is gratifying
to learn, therefore, that the first Dean of this college, while serving in
the Illinois General Assembly in 1867, anticipated international action
on such matters as private management of prison labor by some twentythree years when he succeeded in securing the passage of a bill taking
the Illinois penitentiary out of private hands.1 The recognition which
the book accords to other American pioneers in the field should interest
all concerned in prison management.
W. F. Z.

CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ACCOUNTING:

Donald Schapiro and

Ralph Wienshienk. Brooklyn, New York: University Casebook Series,
The Foundation Press, Inc., 1949. Pp. xxi, 935.
The importance of acquiring a knowledge of accounting, either before or during a law course, receives growing recognition. The authors
of this volume have written with the stated aim of presenting the subject for law students and lawyers. "Emphasis," they say, has been
"shifted from book-keeping routines and procedures to accounting as a
tool in the lawyer's kit." A skillful lawyer can often analyze general
books of account and make immediate and helpful suggestions. His
interpretations may have bearing upon a controversy wherein the books
will play an important part. He may do this because of his background
of general experience, although he may not have the technical training
of a real accountant. His knowledge of facts, however, must often be
amplified by a knowledge of figures and the purposes to which they may
be put.
The present volume starts on a very simple level of explanation concerning those phases of accounting which every lawyer is expected to
know. The material progresses by easy stages to a fairly comprehensive
coverage of accounting as it is known to few but the proficient and experienced. There is a fresh approach to financial statements, and a
thorough consideration of the details regarding principal and income,
points wherein the lawyer and the trust officer are often asked embarrassing questions. The emphasis on all material is the legal one, witness
the ample supply of more than two hundred cases, from courts and
commissions, which furnish authority for the discussion. A lawyer, or
1 See Zacharias, "Joseph Meade Bailey, 1833-1895,"
1-16 (1937), particularly pp. 4-7.
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even an eager law student, could probably follow this material with
understanding. Under an experienced mentor, the study would have
heightened value.
Julius Cohen. Indianapolis,
Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1949. Pp. xiv, 567, and
supplement.

MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON LEGISLATION.

Growing recognition of the importance not alone of statutory interpretation but also of the related subject matter of legislation has led to
the increased teaching of courses of that character. This, in turn, has
made the publication of new casebooks necessary, and Professor Cohen's
book represents the latest addition to a growing parade. The title would
seem to indicate a treatment of only the tasks and skills required in
the drafting of legislation, but an analysis of the book's contents will
demonstrate that its scope is much wider, including within its orbit
problems commonly encountered elsewhere under the heading of statutory
interpretation. Unfortunately, however, insufficient space has been allotted
to important principles regarding the ascertainment of the meaning of
ambiguous legislative language and the utilization of legislative precedents
and analogies in comparison to other, from the student standpoint, less
important subjects.
A chapter dealing with problems relating to investigations conducted
under legislative authority contains much new material as well as presenting a novel arrangement. An additional feature is to be found in
the author's method of taking a particular piece of legislation as the
core of his teaching device and, working from that legislative effort as
a centerpiece, developing all problems arising in connection therewith.
In general, therefore, the book deserves to be classified as an excellent
production.
F. HEmzoG
BOOKS RECEIVED.
Ralph A. Newman. Brooklyn, New York: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1949. Pp. xi, 452.
CASES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY.
Edwin R. Keedy and A. Arthur Schiller.
Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1948. Pp. x, 650.
CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON PRIVATE CORPORATIONS.
I. Maurice
Wormser and Judson A. Crane. Indianapolis, Indiana: The BobbsMerrill Company, 1948. Pp. xiii, 1055.
CASES AND READINGS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE.
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